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MILLAGE ELECTION OUTCOMES IN MICHIGAN PUBLIC SCHOOL
DISTRICTS: A TEST OF THE RATIONAL CHOICE AND
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL VOTING MODELS
Christopher Petras, D.P.A.
Western Michigan University, 1996
In this study, the author tests two models of voting behavior to predict the
likelihood o f a public school millage passing. They are: (1) a rational-choice model,
and (2) a social psychological model. The rational-choice model asserts that the
likelihood of a school millage passing is a function of the millage's economic benefit
as perceived by the voter. The social psychological model asserts that support for the
local school millage is a function o f the voter's political attitudes and/or the salience
of the ballot issue.
The author analyzed every millage election in the 561 (K-12) Michigan public
school districts during the month o f June for the years 1990, 1991, and 1992. The
logit regression findings show that the rational-choice model is successful in
predicting school millage outcomes in two of the three years studied. The social
psychological model, however, is successful in predicting school millage outcomes
for all three years.
Specifically, the likelihood o f a school millage passing is a function of the
number of persons living in rural farm areas, the number of civilians unemployed
within the school district, the amount of the millage renewal requested, the amount of
the millage increase requested, and the past success rate of the school district in
passing a millage referendum. Suggestions for future research are offered.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Public school superintendents perform many managerial tasks such as
motivating employees to perform and empowering the employees. Managerial models
such as total quality management and strategic planning help the superintendent in
developing support among their employees for school affairs and operations. Public
school superintendents are taught a variety of managerial models in educational
administration programs. Some superintendents receive this managerial education in
public administration and business administration courses. Hence, superintendents
have a very clear understanding o f employee behavior and performance outcomes.
What public school superintendents lack, however, is a clear understanding of voting
behavior models and school millage outcomes. Public school superintendents,
however, serve as policy implementors.
Serving as a policy implementor, the superintendent knows what funding is
necessary to deliver school programs effectively. In order to raise funds for policy
implementation, the school superintendent is often called upon to serve as the school
millage campaign strategist. Therefore, a public school superintendent should have a
clear understanding o f voting behavior models and their use in predicting election
outcomes.
Why is an understanding o f voting behavior models and school millage
outcomes quintessential for superintendents? I believe that the electorate is an
integral part o f the superintendent’s work. They are often called upon to financially
1
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support the administrative goals o f the school board, vis-a-vis, the millage election.
Public school superintendents must harness the political attitudes and economic
interests of voters and funnel those dynamics into a “yes” vote at the polls.
Acting primarily as campaign managers for local school millage elections,
public school superintendents must pull-together numerous resources and develop
campaign strategies that will lead voters to pass the millage request. This parallels
campaign management activities for presidential and Congressional campaigns. The
campaign manager must understand the political attitudes and economic interests of
voters and execute an election strategy that reconciles those attitudes and interests.
Voting behavior models can facilitate a superintendent’s understanding of
voters’ political attitudes and economic interests and the effect o f those dynamics on
school millage outcomes. The field o f political science provides a robust literature
base on voting behavior models and Congressional and presidential election
outcomes. Unfortunately, voting behavior models are not typically incorporated with
educational or public administration programs. Therefore, I will explain voting
behavior models and their application to presidential, Congressional, and school
millage elections. There are three objectives for this study.
The first objective o f my study is to explain the evolution of voting behavior
theory and its application to Congressional, presidential, and school millage elections.
I construct three epochs from the literature, which trace the development of voting
behavior theories. They are: (1) the foundational tenets period (pre-1960), (2) the
concrete development period (1960-1976), and (3) the modem expansion period
(1977-present). Voting behavior scholars established the two primary voting
behavior models— social psychological and rational-choice— during these periods.
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Social psychological voting theory asserts that elements such as political
attitudes within voters impact Congressional, presidential, and school millage
outcomes. Feelings, such as trust in our government officials, and their effect on
election outcomes are what social psychological voting scholars address.
Rational-choice voting theory asserts that the voter casts his or her ballot as
a utility maximizer. The voter compares the economic benefits of supporting a
candidate or policy to the costs o f voting for a candidate or policy. If the voter sees a
large economic differential in a candidate or policy and determines that the costs of
voting for the candidate and/or policy are low, the voter will cast his or her ballot of
support for the candidate or policy with the greatest economic retum-on-investment.
My second objective is to empirically answer the research question: “What is
the likelihood o f the voters’ economic interests and political attitudes impacting the
success of a public school millage referendum?” To answer this question, I construct
and test two logit models o f voting. They are: (1) a rational-choice model and (2) a
social psychological model. The dependent variable is the outcome o f each (K-12)
public school millage election during the month of June for the years 1990, 1991, and
1992. School millage outcomes are coded dichotomously as either “ 1” the millage
passed or “0” the millage failed.
The rational-choice model comprises the following independent variables:
(a) median household income within the school district, (b) levels o f education within
the school district, (c) levels o f urbanization within the school district, (d) the number
of households within the school district with children ages 5-17, (e) the ethnicity of
the school district, and (f) the number of civilians unemployed within the school
district.
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The social psychological logit model comprises the following independent
variables: (a) amount o f millage renewal, (b) amount o f additional mills requested,
and (c) the current millage success ratio.
I generate nine hypotheses that assert the likelihood o f certain social
psychological and rational-choice variables affecting the outcome o f a millage
referendum. I analyze the 561 (K-12) public school districts in the state o f Michigan
for a three-year period (1990-1992). School districts are stratified by their student
enrollment size into the categories of very small, small, medium, and large.
My final research objective is to determine if campaign strategies provided in
school millage campaign publications are congruent with social psychological and
rational-choice assumptions o f voting. I examine a sample o f school millage campaign
publications to determine what symmetry, if any, in political attitudes and economic
interests is assumed among voters regardless of a school district’s size. If voters vary
in their political attitudes and economic interests across school districts, millage
campaign strategies should reflect those variances.
This study is a departure from previous school millage research because it
analyzes school millage outcomes on a macro-level. Research on school millage
outcomes is usually case specific. The unit of analysis is one school district. This
study, however, provides a broad profile o f school millage outcomes for an entire
state. Hence, Michigan public school superintendents will know what impacts the
likelihood o f school millages passing on a state-wide basis versus a case-specific
basis. In other words, public school superintendents will see the impact o f rationalchoice and social psychological voting behaviors on public school millage outcomes
in their state. This will provide a more robust picture of voting behavior and its
impact on school millage outcomes.
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This study integrates both quantitative and qualitative research methods. By
empirically testing voting behavior models and school millage outcomes, I provide
public school superintendents with a look at the degree to which political attitudes
and the economic interests o f voters impact the outcome o f a school millage election.
Analyzing campaign strategies and comparing them to rational-choice and social
psychological assumptions will provide public school superintendents with a look at
the congruency between voting behavior assumptions and millage campaign
strategies.
If congruency between voting behavior theory and published millage
campaign strategies is missing, public school superintendents must build a level of
congruency into their campaign work. This is especially true if voting behavior
dynamics vary by school district size. For example, if symmetry in political attitudes
and economic interests is true for all voters, differences in school district size should
not matter, and therefore neither should the millage campaign strategy. However, if
the political attitudes and economic interests of voters vary by school district and
school district size does matter, superintendents can expect differences in voters’
attitudes and interests as they advance among school districts. Hence millage
campaign strategies should be designed to accommodate the differences in political
attitudes and economic interests among school district voters by district size.
The state o f Michigan is a ripe source for this study. Recently, the voters of
Michigan approved o f a state-legislative proposal to reform the way in which school
districts generate revenues for school operations. Between 1990 and 1994, the state
of Michigan brought before its citizens two proposals to reform the method by which
local school districts generate revenue from the local property tax. The first request
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failed. However, the second request, in the form o f Proposal A, succeeded by a
plurality o f the voters.
I believe it is too early to conclude if Proposal A has accomplished its
legislative goal. Michigan public school districts financed a substantial portion o f their
school operations from the school millage. Since Proposal A was passed, Michigan
public school districts must continue to finance their building construction,
remodeling, and technology programs from local millages. Therefore, public school
superintendents must understand the impact of voters’ political attitudes and
economic interests on school millage outcomes and then design appropriate millage
strategies.
Three points are stressed in this study. First, voting behavior assumptions
developed for estimating Congressional and presidential election outcomes may be
helpful in estimating school millage outcomes. Second, I contend that voters’ political
attitudes and economic interests are an integral part o f understanding school millage
outcomes. Third, millage campaign strategies should reflect voting behavior
assumptions if superintendents want to increase the likelihood o f the millage
referendum passing.
Public school superintendents must know what shapes voters’ support for the
school millage request and harness that support into a “yes” vote at the polls. I
believe models o f voting behavior can provide a useful contribution to our knowledge
o f school millage outcomes and serve as a useful guide when designing campaign
strategies.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CHAPTER II
A HISTORICAL LOOK AT RATIONAL-CHOICE AND
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL MODELS OF VOTING
AND ELECTION OUTCOMES
Why Vote?
Explaining why voters turnout at the polls and support or oppose political
candidates and public policies is a concern to both campaign strategists and local
government officials. Voters cast ballots for a number o f proposals and referenda.
Campaign strategists and local government officials need cues from their respective
electorates to increase the likelihood of their candidate or policy winning in an
election. If local government officials, such as public school superintendents, know
what shapes the electorates’ degree of support for a millage request, they can design
a campaign strategy that will increase the likelihood o f passing the millage.
To explain voter turnout and participation, we must first examine the
theoretical assumptions from which voting behavior is derived. We currently know
that voters possess political attitudes and economic interests which shape their degree
of support for political candidates and public policies. This chapter focuses on when
these assumptions o f voting behavior developed, and in turn, how they affect election
outcomes.
Theories o f voting are classified primarily into two models. The first model,
social psychological, focuses upon sociological dimensions o f voting, the political

7
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attitudes of voters, issue salience, and the effect of those three dynamics on electoral
outcomes.
Work on social psychological models of voting behavior began with
assumptions about the social status of voters and electoral turnout. Later,
sociological assumptions about voters developed into complex attitudinal and
behavioral theories derived primarily from the field o f psychology. Political attitudes
such as apathy and efficacy are now analyzed with election outcomes to determine
the degree to which feelings such as alienation affect electoral outcomes. How voters
feel about their role in politics and the salience of a policy issue impacts the degree to
which they support political candidates and policies.
The second voting model is more popularly called the rational-choice or
rational-action model. Rational-choice models examine an individual’s economic selfinterest (the pocket-book issue), an individual’s overall concern for society’s
economic well-being (sociotropic voting), and the effect o f those economic interests
on electoral outcomes.
Rational-choice models are derived primarily from utility maximization
assumptions developed in the field of economics. Utility maximization precepts
suggest that individual decisions represent a cosfrbenefit function for the voter. The
greater the economic differential (benefit) from selecting a particular political
candidate or policy, when compared to the cost of voting for a particular political
candidate or policy, the greater the likelihood of that voter supporting a particular
policy or political candidate.
Voting behavior models are rarely discussed as an evolution o f assumptions.
Instead, most treatises on the subject are presented in a survey o f the seminal works
(Niemi & Weisberg, 1993a, 1993b). Dalton and Wattenberg (1993), however,
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discuss voting behavior models as paradigm shifts which I believe is more
appropriate. Many o f the precepts found in rational-choice and social psychological
models o f voting are derived from economic and psychological assumptions about
consumer behavior. The way we view the consumer and their purchasing decisions
has evolved from changes in consumer interests. We must therefore view the
development o f voting behavior models as an evolution o f the changes in voter
decision-making processes.
I construct three epochs o f voting behavior theory development. They are:
(1) the foundation period (pre-1960), (2) the concrete development period (19601976), and (3) the modem expansion period (1977-present). Several key
assumptions are addressed from these eras which helped shape the way we think
about voters, their decision-making processes, and electoral outcomes.
My review o f the literature on voting and Congressional and presidential
election outcomes evolves into a model of voting and school millage outcomes.
School millage outcomes are explained in a manner similar to Congressional and
presidential outcomes. They are a function of (a) the political attitudes held by voters,
and (b) the economic interests o f voters. Public school superintendents need to know
what induces their electorate to support a school millage request. By reviewing the
evolution o f voting behavior models, I will show parallels between the determinants
o f Congressional and presidential election outcomes and school millage election
outcomes.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

10
The Foundational Period (Pre-1960)
Social Psychological Voting
Social psychological voting theory explains election outcomes as a function o f
a voter’s belief about their role in politics, the attitudes they formulate toward
political candidates and public policies, and the salience o f an issue. Various political
attitudes develop within voters from their experience (or inexperience) with
government institutions and processes. Political institutions and activities, such as
political party activism and election canvassing, shape the political attitudes o f voters,
which in turn, shape various degrees o f support for political candidates or policies.
The social psychological voting models of today evolved from sociological
assumptions o f voting developed in the early part o f the 1940s.
These socioeconomic assumptions about voters were posited by Lazarsfeld,
Berelson, and Gaudet (1944) and Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee (1954). They
asserted that socioeconomic variables such as income and education were correlated
with voter turnout. They found that higher income, higher education, and higher
status occupations were in fact correlated with higher voter turnout rates.
If campaign strategists wanted to increase the likelihood of electoral success,
they would have to first target voters with higher incomes, higher education levels,
and higher status occupations because this segment o f the electoral population would
have a higher likelihood of voting during a presidential or Congressional election.
This finding did not, however, help the campaign strategist determine what would
induce a voter to turnout at the poll and cast a supporting ballot. The findings merely
showed a correlation between the demographic and economic characteristics o f the
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voter and turn out numbers. Nonetheless, a phenomenon known as cross-pressure,
surfaced in the early sociological research on voting .
Cross-pressure theory suggests that when voters o f higher income levels,
higher education levels, and higher job occupational status encounter differences in
their political views among their socioeconomic cohorts, their differences form, in the
mind o f the voter, a state o f cognitive dissonance where the individual voter cannot
decide which public policy or political candidate to support. As a result, the voter will
abstain from casting a ballot rather than risk voting against or for a policy or
candidate that is contrary to another cohort’s value. During this stage in the
development o f voting behavior theory, data were readily available, in secondary
form, through Census documents and then analyzed using correlation analysis.
Almost 20 years later, another group o f scholars would expand beyond the
sociological dimensions of voting by examining the political psychology, or attitudinal
dimensions, o f the voter. For example, Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes
(1960) would tap political feelings of voters through survey research and then profile
the American voter on attitudinal dimensions such as political alienation, political
identification, and political efficacy. They discovered that voters have feelings about
politics that are not necessarily positive and that shape their degree of support for
political candidates and public policies.
Social psychological modeling eventually made us aware o f the need to
collect data from voters such as their feelings about political participation,
government access, and registration processes. Pollsters would use methods such as
survey research and focus group interviews to collect the data. Campaign strategists
could then create a barometer of political attitudes, whether negative or positive, and
then attribute those attitudes to a candidate or public policy.
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While the foundation o f social psychological voting was developing, the
rational-choice theorists were constructing an economic theory of voting that would
explain voting and election outcomes as a function of the economic interests of the
voter. Instead o f tapping voter attitudes about issues and candidates, rational-choice
theorists would correlate the costs and benefits of voting with election outcomes.
Rational-Choice Voting
Rational-choice theories o f voting explain election outcomes as a function o f
voters’ economic self-interest or the person’s overall interest in society’s economic
well-being (sociotropic). Elections translate into economic gains or losses to the
voter who seeks to maximize his or her economic benefit while minimizing the costs
associated with voting. This explanation of election outcomes finds support as far
back as the middle 1800s. In a democracy, the feeling was the majority will elect
candidates who promise the greatest benefits from the public treasury. Voting for
public officials and policies for economists is thus considered a function o f utility
maximization.
Utility maximization theory provides the impetus for most rational-choice
assumptions. For example, when consumers purchase goods or services, they
conduct a cost/benefit analysis. The costs of purchasing a good or service are
factored against the perceived benefits of having the good or service. The costs must
be less than the perceived benefits before the consumer will make the purchase.
Translated into elections, voters seek to increase their retum-on-investment when
casting a ballot. The investment equals the cost of an individual’s effort to cast a
ballot (e.g., the time spent on registering to vote) while the return equals the
economic benefit received from supporting a policy or political candidate.
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The formal development o f rational-choice voting assumptions began with
treatises by Hotelling (1929) and Schumpeter (1950). Both scholars argued that
voting is a function o f the perceived economic differential one will receive by
supporting a particular political candidate or policy. Downs (1957, 1960), however,
provided the first robust application of utility maximization theory to voting.
Downs (1957) examined the perceived costs and benefits associated with
voting and the concomitant strategies political parties must develop for enticing
voters into their coalitions. He argued that the economics of politics was such that
political parties had to create policy platforms to win elections instead o f winning
elections to create policy platforms. Downs (1957) showed that by creating policy
platforms before the election, political parties could create economic differentials for
the voters who could then calculate the costs and benefits of supporting a particular
party. Voters will support the political party that promises the greatest economic
utility. Using the Downsian model, for example, voters enter into the coalition
(political party) that uses the state for redistributing benefits to the other coalition.
The costs are allocated by the winning coalition to those individuals belonging to the
higher income coalition. Hence, voters will cast a vote of support for the political
party that promises the largest economic utility.
By using our redistributive policy example, we find that in a two-party
system, if the bottom 50% on the income continuum plus one (the median voter)
voted for a referendum, they would be the winning party. This would permit a greater
redistribution o f income than if the upper 50% plus one formed the majority coalition.
The key voter in this situation is the one making just at or above the median income.
This person (the median voter) must be enticed into the lower income coalition to
ensure a majority coalition. The minimum income taxed must be fixed just above this
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person’s income; furthermore, this person must be included in the redistributional
benefit. The relationship between the economic interests o f voters and election
turnout is expressed as follows:
Let R = PB - C
where: R = net rewards (benefits) to turning out;
B = expected candidate (or party) or issue differential;
C = costs o f turning out;
P = probability turning out will affect the outcome;
turnout if and only if R>0.
Downs (1957, p. 40) stressed that the size of the voter’s current party
differential is the key, that is, the difference between the utility income he or she
actually received in period t and the one he or she would have received if the
opposition would have been in power. He further emphasized the importance o f
information costs and the strategies used by voters to reduce those costs. For
example, voters attempt to reduce information costs by relying upon their own
evaluation o f past and future performance of a candidate. Retrospective and
prospective models o f voting, which I address later, evolved from this assumption.
Downs’ (1957) economic interpretation of voting greatly influenced the way
we think about the rationality o f electoral politics. In order for turnout to lead to
support at the polls, voters would have to perceive an economic benefit that
exceeded the cost o f the effort to vote. Furthermore, voters would have to perceive
that their vote mattered in an election and that the information underlying their
decisions is credible enough for them to rationally cast a ballot.
The research conducted during the foundational period was ripe for
expansion. Social psychological scholars began to develop survey instruments that
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would measure voters’ political attitudes. Once those political attitudes were
measured, analysts could then assess the extent to which political attitudes, whether
negative or positive, shaped the outcome o f electoral contests. Rational-choice
scholars, on the other hand, began developing and testing models o f voting that
would attempt to correct for some methodological limitations discovered after
Downs’ (1957) study entitled An Economic Theory o f Democracy was published.
The Concrete Development Period (1960-1976)
Social Psychological Voting
The study o f political attitudes of voters, the salience of political issues, and
their effect on election outcomes took the forefront during the early part of the
concrete development period. Campbell et al. (1960) published the first
comprehensive study o f political attitudes and their correlation with election
outcomes. Their social psychological model of voting expanded from what had
previously been merely a socioeconomic approach to voting. Their profile o f the
American voter emphasized socioeconomic status, political participation, political
knowledge, and concern for political issues.
After analyzing national election data from 1948, 1952, and 1956, Campbell
and his colleagues (1960) concluded that American voters were unconcerned,
uneducated, and passive with regard to politics. Furthermore, the primary cue for
electoral decision-making was the political party. The results of this study provided
campaign strategists with new considerations when designing electoral strategies. For
if Downs’ (1957) assertion of economic interests and voting were correct and
Campbell et al.’s (1960) assertion of voters following the party were sustained,
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campaign strategists would have to develop election strategies that differentiated the
economic benefits o f their candidate or policies while at the same time convincing
voters that support for a candidate or policy was support for the political party.
Unlike the research o f political sociologists such as Berelson et al. (1954),

The American Voter study suggested that socioeconomic correlates of voter turnout
were insufficient as an explanation o f voter support for policies and candidates.
Instead, if voters were educated about the issues and candidates and could
differentiate the economic benefits o f a policy or candidate and factor costs
associated with supporting a policy or candidate, campaign strategists could link
negative political attitudes to the opposition party. This, in turn, would increase the
likelihood of a voter casting a ballot in support o f the other candidate or policy.
Voters, however, would have to feel involved in politics and that their vote
mattered. Election outcomes were considered a function of political party affiliation
during the early to mid 1960s. This became important to understanding the impact of
Downs’ (1957) model on election outcomes. The political party would have to entice
the voter into their coalition by tapping their economic interests and educating them
on the issues.
The theme o f political illiteracy came under fire in the research of Nie, Verba,
and Petrocik (1976). They analyzed U.S. Congressional and presidential election data
from 1956, 1958, 1964, 1968, 1970, and 1972. Nie et al. (1976) concluded that the
American voter was actually well aware of, and sensitive to, political issues. It was
the salience, or importance, o f the issue that mattered to the voter and not their party
identification when deciding to participate in politics or cast a ballot at the polls.
It was now speculated that the political party was playing a lesser role in
election outcomes while the candidate centered campaign became larger. This finding
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changed the way campaign strategists would eventually focus their methods. The
political attitudes and economic interests of voters would now shape a candidate’s
stance on issues. Hence, campaign strategists worried less about the attitudes and
economic interests espoused by the political parties and focused more on the attitudes
and economic interests o f the candidate while at the same time bonding the candidate
with the electorate.
The assumptions o f social psychological voting that developed during the
concrete development period were used primarily to construct models o f voting that
correlated socioeconomic factors with national election outcomes. Research
consistently showed that socioeconomic factors, such as income and education, were
strongly correlated with election turnout. This, however, led some to criticize the
social psychological approach for focusing too narrowly on demographic and
economic characteristics o f voters and neglecting their political attitudes. Criticism,
such as failing to incorporate interpersonal communication processes among voters
into their social psychological voting assumptions, surfaced.
Knoke (1990) thus argued that failing to include elements such as whether or
not a voter participated in an election suggests that voters are “atomized actors
floating unanchored in a homogenized stream of national mass-media stimuli, their
perceptions unfiltered by constraining and validating personal relationships”
(p. 1058). Other criticisms focused upon the inability o f scholars to establish whether
or not political attitudes precede political participation or whether political
participation precedes political attitudes.
Leighley (1995) explains the temporal precedence issue by arguing that
“misspecifying the relationship between individual’s attitudes and political
participation . . . [made] causes o f participation impossible to draw” (p. 187). This
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criticism eventually subsided when social psychological voting scholars refocused
their attention toward the construction of survey instrumentation that would measure
political feelings. The order o f individual political attitudes and behaviors became a
secondary thought. Measuring those political attitudes and feelings came first. Once
attitudes and behaviors were measured, their impact on election outcomes could be
determined.
The newer social psychological voting models showed that the political
psychology of the voter is very complex. Linking political attitudes to support for
policies and political candidates would require the use of sophisticated survey
instrumentation or concomitant proxy variables. The rational-choice scholars, on the
other hand, discovered theoretical and methodological issues that challenged their
approach.
Social Psychological Voting and School Millaee Outcomes
Assumptions about political attitudes and school millage outcomes were the
focus o f theorists such as Jennings (1973) during the concrete development period.
They found that attitudes on issues such as school system quality matter somewhat in
determining school millage success.
Social psychological assumptions expanded into areas such as the taxpayer
revolt and community conflict. For example, during the early part of the concrete
development period, Lamb (1972) and Alexander and Bass (1974) found that voting
in school millage elections often translates into a protest against higher taxes by
voters. In other words, voters will cast a “no” vote for a school millage request as a
sign o f protest.
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Later studies o f tax proposals, however, showed no linkages between social
psychological or rational-choice voting assumptions and tax proposal outcomes.
Lowery and Sigelman (1981) developed eight explanations (self-interest, tax-level,
tax distribution, economic pinch, political ideology, political disaffection, tax
efficiency, and information explanation) of the tax revolt. Their analysis found no
statistical support for any one o f these explanations. Later, they expanded their model
by proposing eight revised explanations (Sigelman & Lowery, 1983).
Their revised explanations are: (I) tax level, (2) tax distribution, (3) cost/
benefit, (4) political ideology, (5) political participation, (6) political culture,
(7) diffusion o f innovations, and (8) a rules-of-the-game. Again, they found little
empirical support for their tax revolt explanations with the exception o f the diffusion
of innovations explanation. Sigelman and Lowery (1983) found that the tax revolt
comes from what they call a “contagion” into neighboring states.
Tax revolt fever spreads from citizen interactions among neighboring states
and not by administrative interactions. What makes this finding interesting is that it is
the inverse o f the findings in the policy diffusion research by Walker (1969), Gray
(1973) and Press and Verburg (1979). Tax revolt limitations would later be examined
by Downes (1993) during the modem expansion period.
The cultural values o f a community were studied by Hahn and Almy (1971)
and Acock and Haley (1975) to determine their effect, if any, on support for the
school millage request. They found that race affects support for the public school
millage request. Giles, Gatlin, and Cataldo (1976) discovered, during the later part of
the concrete development period, that the social status of the voter and feelings of
powerlessness toward school officials affect voter support for school millage
requests. Voters with a higher socioeconomic status are more likely to support the
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school millage; voters who feel they have no control over their school system are
unlikely to do so.
During the concrete development period, social psychological voting research
taught public school superintendents that they would have to design millage
campaign strategies that involved citizens in the campaign process. Furthermore,
voters would have to be involved in school issues throughout the school year to build
feelings o f political efficacy and control over their school system.
If voters felt that they were involved in school functions and controlled the
destiny o f their school, they would be more likely to support the school millage
request.
Rational-Choice Voting
Voting behavior theory took an unusual twist during the concrete
development period when rational-choice scholars faced the unpleasant discovery
that voting was not a rational act for anyone. The paradox o f voting would force
rational-choice scholars to reconsider their assumptions about voting.
The paradox o f voting posits that voters may support policies and political
candidates who show great promise of an economic retum-on-investment. However,
the probability o f one voter turning out and affecting an election outcome will
approach zero as the electoral population increases. Hence, any economic benefit
multiplied by zero will most likely produce a non-rational result. The voter should
therefore abstain from voting. Many voters, however, still turnout at election time
and vote even though it is a nonrational act. Olson (1965) applied rational-choice
assumptions to interest group participation and found similar limitations to rationalchoice precepts.
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Interest groups, such as labor unions and political parties, comprise what
Olson (1965) called collective action. He asserted that individuals join these groups if
their activities produce collective benefits that outweigh the costs o f participation.
Olson’s (1965) model o f political participation could be expressed as follows:
A, = P,B - C,
where: A, = the level o f activism of individual i
P, = the probability that individual i’s participation will bring about the
collective good or policy goals o f the group;
B = the collective benefits or public goods resulting from the implementation
o f a group’s program;
C, = the costs to individual i of contributing to the collective good.
Downs (1957), Olson (1965), and Riker and Ordeshook (1968) challenged
the rationality of interest participation and voter turnout by arguing that “B” could
easily exceed “C,” but that in any reasonably large group or electorate population,
“P” will approach zero. Thus, it is more rational to abstain from participating in
interest groups or voting in elections. However, abstaining occurs very rarely for
many voters. Large numbers o f citizens vote, for example, during elections, including
a disproportionate number o f those with higher levels o f education and information,
who should supposedly know better.1
To address the paradox of voting, Downs (1957), Olson (1965), and Riker
and Ordeshook (1968) added a consumptive benefit term to the rational-choice
model. This newer version o f the rational-choice model could be expressed as
follows:
Let: R = PB - C + D
where: D = consumptive benefits.
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Similarly, a neo-rational-choice model o f interest group participation could be
expressed as follows:
Let: A, = P,B - C, + D
where: D = consumptive benefits.
Consumptive benefits include various forms o f satisfaction derived from
voting, such as a higher sense o f civic duty, political efficacy, or a desire to avoid
social ostracism. Therefore, feelings o f a high sense o f civic involvement will increase
the likelihood o f voting. Riker and Ordeshook (1968) found that the more voters feel
a sense of a civic duty to vote, the higher the turnout becomes for electoral contests.
By adding the consumptive benefit term to the rational-choice model,
rational-choice scholars lessened the theoretical distinctions between social
psychological and rational-choice models. Nonetheless, a new issue arose where if
the probability o f a voter’s ballot affecting the election outcome and the benefits
received from a candidate or policy were less than the cost o f voting (PB < C), voter
turnout was now made rational by habit and not by judgements about candidates and
electoral situations (Riker & Ordeshook, 1968). The costs and benefits associated
with voting would no longer matter if voting were habitual. Another issue arose as to
whether voters could accurately estimate the impact of their vote on an election
outcome. This led to a new stream o f voting behavior research.
Alternative Rational-Choice Models
Ferejohn and Fiorina (1974) introduced the “minimax regret” model as an
alternative to estimating the impact o f an individual’s vote on an election outcome.
Their model suggests that voters are guided by a preference to minimize the
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probability that a least preferred outcome will occur. In other words, voters try to
minimize the possibility that the least preferred candidate will win the election.
The minimax-regret model did not provide campaign strategists with a
realistic view o f voter decision-making. As Mueller (1989) points out, voter
indifference between two candidates should result in an abstention from voting,
according to minimax regret assumptions. However, if an undesirable candidate
enters the race, voters must go to the polls to prevent the undesirable candidate from
winning the election by one vote. The unlikelihood of such an event moved rationalchoice scholars to reexamine vote impact.
Vote impact was examined by scholars such as Beck (1975) who discarded
the “P” factor altogether. While the impact of the vote mattered theoretically, in
reality Beck (1975) showed that voters could not adequately determine the impact of
their vote on an election outcome but cast ballots anyway.
If voters did calculate the closeness o f an election, campaign strategists would
have to convince voters that failing to vote might give the opposition a one vote
victory margin during the election. The problem, however, is that many elections are
not close. Instead, they result in landslide victories usually for incumbents.
Other solutions to the paradox o f voting included the use o f game-theory
techniques such as the prisoner’s dilemma. Discussion of this dilemma is intended to
enhance cooperation among group members who know nothing about the other
members’ decisions. Cooperation is obtained by manipulating event (election)
conditions.
There are four ways in which campaign strategists could obtain cooperation
using the prisoner’s dilemma technique. They are: (1) not discounting future events,
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(2) repeating the events over time, (3) maintaining uncertainty for how the event
ends, and (4) punishing defectors without punishing cooperators (Hardin, 1971).
Game-theory proved unrealistic for real-life political situations. For example,
political party activists rarely punish non-activists within the same party in the
American political party system. Doing so might jeopardize membership enrollments.
Unlike political party systems in countries such as Great Britain, where members pay
dues, political party membership in the United States is free. Therefore, sanctions
against members for nonparticipation may discourage voluntary membership.
The economic self-interest of voters surfaced again during this period in the
rational-choice camp. This time rational voting scholars focused on the economic
concern a voter has for other voters. Mueller (1989) explains that this altruistic
concern for other voters was believed to induce voters into participating in elections.
However, the model did not fare well because critics, such as Mueller, argued that
voters cannot determine if their participation will make any difference.
Such reconciliation o f the paradox of voting and participation also led to
other problems. Barry (1970) and Niemi (1976) argued that calculating the costs and
benefits o f elections was irrational. Costs and benefits are too small to calculate and
therefore should be eliminated from rational models. Furthermore, as Whiteley
(1995) argues, this reconciliation solves the paradox of voting by eliminating the
rational-choice model. If costs and benefits are too small to calculate, the rational
model is no longer useful in solving rational-choice problems.
Reconciling of the paradox of voting carried into the early years o f the
modem expansion period o f voting behavior theory development and continues
today. Factoring the costs and benefits o f voting is still an essential component of
rational-choice modeling. Campaign strategists must convince voters that supporting

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

25
a particular candidate or policy will bring economic benefits far greater than the
benefits o f not voting.
The concrete development period of voting behavior theory taught us that the
economic self-interest o f voters and their political attitudes are much more than
correlates of election outcomes; they are determinants of election outcomes. It
became clear by the end o f the concrete development period that voting behavior
assumptions are important and that campaign strategists and public officials must
understand how to apply those assumptions to their election strategies.
For the most part, studies o f voting and election outcomes during the next
period, modem expansion, refined some o f the earlier models found in rational-choice
and social psychological research. However, new research on institutional contexts
within the American political system and voter turnout (e.g., Powell, 1986) showed
that political attitudes are shaped by the levels of encouragement given by
government institutions. Citizens develop attitudes toward government based in part
on the encouragement given to vote during elections.
Rational-Choice Voting and School Millage Outcomes
Development and application o f rational-choice voting assumptions to school
millage outcomes peaked in the mid 1960s and early 1970s. The economic selfinterest o f the voter was analyzed by scholars such as Boss (1973, 1976), who
asserted that support for a school millage request is a function of the economic selfinterest of the voter. Relying heavily upon Downs’ (1957) median voter theory, Boss
argued that voting for the supply o f school goods is found at the equilibrium between
supply and median preference. He found that collective demand for education
increases as the tax-price per unit o f education decreases.
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Jennings (1973) examined the tax capacity o f the school district and support
for public school millage requests. He found that as the tax capacity o f the district
decreases, so does support for school millage requests. When voters have fewer
resources available to support school functions, they tend not to support the local
school millage request.
The rational-choice model continued to flourish in the research o f Hall and
Piele (1976). They asserted that voting during the public school millage election is an
act of economic self-interest and that various socioeconomic characteristics o f the
voter, such as occupation and household income, are best estimates of support for a
public school millage request. They found that support for the school millage request
is a function of a voter’s income, occupational status, and level o f education.
However, they noted that these variables are not as important as the past pattern of
millage support within the school district.
Public school superintendents have to consider the ability o f the voter to pay
additional taxes for school operations when their capacity is reached. Designing a
campaign strategy under these conditions requires the superintendent to build
previous levels of support to ensure that the current millage will pass.
Modem Expansion Period (1977-Present)
Social Psychological Voting
The study of institutional structures and their processes (e.g., voter
registration) opened a new chapter on the social psychological assumptions of voting
in the early 1980s. Crewe (1981) and Powell (1986) showed that stringent
registration requirements lead to lower turnout rates among industrialized

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

27
democracies, including the United States. This is attributed to feelings o f political
alienation developed from attempts to participate in the registration process. When
voters must jump institutional hurdles, such as registration processes and residency
requirements, they feel, among other things, alienated from the political system.
Social psychological scholars studied the preference ranking o f issues among
voters in the late 1980s. By finding a fixed ranking of preferences among voters,
election campaign strategists and public officials could narrow their campaign focus
and costs. Rivers (1988) argued that attitudinal dimensions, such as political party
preference and issue salience, are values that rank in importance, individually, by each
voter. No fixed aggregate rankings o f political attitudes and salient issues exist
because the context o f the voter’s environment determines the volatility o f their
political attitudes. This argument is supported in the work of Miller and Shanks
(1990) and Shanks and Miller (1991).
If campaign strategists seek consistent rankings of political attitudes by
voters, they will be hard-pressed to find them. Political attitudes change with the
times and the context o f the voter’s environment. Campaign strategists must assess
the context of the voter’s environment for each election.
Social Psychological Voting and School Millage Outcomes
Kowalski (1977) developed a social psychological model showing that
positive political attitudes increase the likelihood of support for the school millage
request. He found some strength in his hypothesis but not enough to warrant any
change in the way we view political attitudes and their effect on school millage
outcomes.
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A relatively new addition to social psychological theory is found in the
research on “psychological sense o f community (PSC).” Davidson and Cotter (1993)
explain that PSC is a strong attachment that people experience toward others based
on factors such as where they live, where they work, where they go to school, or
with which groups they affiliate. People high in PSC orientation possess the following
characteristics: (a) a feeling o f belongingness, (b) the belief that they influence and
are influenced by their referent group, (c) the belief that their needs are met by the
collective capabilities o f the group, and (d) a feeling of emotional connectedness.
When aggregated, these attributes are believed to induce higher levels o f community
participation and thus increase the likelihood of support for a school millage request
(Davidson & Cotter, 1993).
Davidson and Cotter (1993), though, found that psychological sense of
community has little impact on voter support during public school millage elections.
They concur with Hall and Piele (1976) that economic conditions are more important
in predicting the likelihood of support for a school millage request.
Current research on social psychological voting and school millage outcomes
has focused on the elderly and their impact on school millage elections as voters. This
literature was influenced by the concept o f public regardingness (Wilson & Banfield,
1964) where tenure within the community determines support for local policies. The
longer citizens live in a community, the stronger their attachment to the community
becomes. Hence, residents with longer tenure feel a greater need to support policies
that benefit their community’s well-being. The research of Beck and Dye (1982) and
Appleton and Williams (1986) shows that elderly voters are much less opposed to
local taxes than conventional wisdom might dictate.
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Elderly voters who migrate to areas such as the South from northern areas o f
the country believe that higher taxes for goods and services are concomitant with
more effective good and service delivery. Does this mean that these transplanted
elderly have a higher level of public regardingness for their local school districts?
According to the research of Button (1992), this is not the case. To the contrary,
elderly voters are more driven by their economic self-interest to the detriment o f
younger persons. The elderly tend not to support school millage or bond requests.
Therefore, no clear indication of public regardingness exists when social
psychological assumptions of voting are applied to school millage support.
Social psychological studies of voting have most recently examined the
cumulative influence o f school officials on voters’ attitudes and the impact o f those
attitudes on support for school millage requests. Brokaw, Gale, and Merz (1990)
tested a model o f the cumulative influence o f school officials on voters attitudes and
the impact of those attitudes on support for a school bond referendum. They found
that the informational campaign implemented by school officials has a positive
influence on voters’ attitudes. This positive influence takes the form of a positive
attitude within the voter who then tends to favor the school referendum request.
Downes (1993) examined the effect o f tax-revolt limitations on equalizing
education burdens and student performance by school district. What makes this
approach interesting is that Downes extended the equalization question from tax
burden to student effect. He found that while the tax-revolt equalized tax burdens for
property owners in California, it failed to equalize student performance.
Does any one model of social psychological or rational voting best explain or
predict support for a school millage request? My review of the literature suggests
not. Similarly, we are afforded one study (Cataldo & Holm, 1983) that ambitiously
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tests five explanations o f school millage outcomes to determine which explanations)
best estimate the likelihood o f support for the school millage request. The five
explanations are: (1) rational self-interest, (2) socioeconomic status, (3) political
attitudes, (4) tax payer revolt, and (5) community conflict. They found that all five
explanations are statistically weak in predicting support for school millage requests.
The only significant explanation o f school millage outcomes here pertains to
community conflict.
Rational-choice scholars entered the modem expansion period of voting
behavior theory by redefining how a voter calculated the costs and benefits o f
supporting a particular candidate or policy. The consumptive benefits term was
redefined while past and future economic conditions were studied to determine a
voter’s support for a candidate or policy.
Rational-Choice Voting
Rational-choice scholars spent most of the late 1970s and early 1980s
replicating voting models and attempting to solve the paradox o f voting. Palfrey and
Rosenthal (1983) approached the paradox o f voting by treating voting decisions as a
strategic calculus game where voters consider the actions of others when deciding to
cast a vote. If a voter anticipates that other voters will abstain on election day he or
she will consequently choose to cast a ballot.
Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983) asserted that when voters anticipated the
abstention o f other voters this would increase their perceived impact of their own
vote. They found that if voters are uncertain about the costs of voting for a candidate
or policy and the electoral population is large, voters will only cast ballots if their
“psychic benefits” exceed the costs of voting (Palfrey & Rosenthal, 1985).
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The strategic calculus model reminded campaign strategists of the need to
design strategies that would build high levels o f perceived economic benefits. If
benefits are perceived as being greater than voting costs, campaign strategists will
thus have increased the probability o f victory at the polls.
The relationship between economic conditions and election outcomes was
analyzed in the early part of the modem expansion period with retrospective and
prospective voting models. These models assert that past and projected economic
conditions impact voters’ attitudes toward political candidates and policies. When
voters feel that past economic conditions were favorable during the incumbent’s term
in office, they will most likely vote for the incumbent. However, if past economic
conditions are viewed unfavorably by the voters, they will tend not to vote for the
incumbent. These same precepts hold true when examining projected economic
conditions and incumbent reelection rates.
Several scholars (Fair, 1978, 1988; Fiorina, 1981; Kuklinski & West, 1981;
Lewis-Beck, 1988; Lockerbie, 1991; MacKuen, Erikson, & Stimson, 1988) argue
that the past and projected performance of the economy is a strong determinant of
voter choices during an election. Rice (1985) argues, however, that economic
factors, such as affirmative action and job training are often neglected in rational
modeling and that they should be factored into such calculations because they alter
wealth without transferring income. Currently, few studies address this issue.
The past and projected performance of the economy has become a potentially
strong strategic weapon for campaign strategists. When voters perceive past
economic hardship as an attribution of the incumbent, the challenger can create an
economic benefit differential that will increase the probability o f a voter supporting
them. On the other hand, economic prosperity can create an economic benefit
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differential for the incumbent that will increase the candidate’s likelihood of
reelection.
Redefining the consumptive benefits portion o f the rational model has
enhanced our understanding of election outcomes. Scholars, such as Moon (1992),
have adjusted the rational-choice model by re-specifying the meaning of consumptive
benefits. Moon’s consumptive benefits term includes variables such as political
education, political efficacy, and citizen duty to vote. Furthermore, he includes an
information processing variable to establish the impact o f information usage by voters
on election outcomes. Moon concludes that voters information processing capacities
have little impact on election outcomes. For campaign managers, this means
educating the electorate. Informational campaigns are required to teach voters about
the issues so they understand the economic benefit in supporting a particular
candidate or policy.
Rational-Choice Voting and School Millaee Outcomes
In the early part o f the modem expansion period, Rubinfeld (1977) enhanced
the use of the rational voter model by examining the relationship between the number
of children a household has in public school, the level o f household income, the price
of public schooling, and previous support for the school millage request. He
concluded that support for a school millage request is largely a function o f the
number o f children a voter has in public schools.
Lankford (1985) developed an integrated model o f rational and social
psychological voting. He constructed a demand-preference model of school
expenditures which depicted an economic self-interest relationship between
preference and demand and support for school millage requests. He found that school
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enrollment and school district employment moderately impacted support for school
millage requests. By adding a social psychological component, voter perceptions of
the quality of education, Lankford showed that voter perceptions o f the quality of
education have a greater impact on support for school millage requests than does the
economic self-interest o f the voter.
Since the number of children a voter has in public schools and the voter’s
perception o f quality education influences school millage outcomes, public school
superintendents have to convey a message to the voter that his or her child will
receive a quality education and that this quality will bring future economic benefits to
the child.
Federalism also emerged in the rational-choice studies o f school financing.
However, the application o f federalism models to voting behavior was not that clear.
For example, Kearney and Kim (1990) examined the impact and distributional effects
of changes in grant funding for local public school districts. They conclude that the
switch from the categorical grant to the block grant method o f funding by the federal
government during the 1980s shifted resources from less advantaged groups in
Michigan public school districts to those not requiring financial assistance. Hence
fewer resources reached the needier districts. Furthermore, this shift in grant funding
decreased overall funding to districts (a) with large percentages of poor children,
(b) in highly urbanized areas, and (c) with smaller school districts.
Voting behavior assumptions have taught us how to look at voting from
micro and macro perspectives. Table 1 shows the evolution o f voting behavior
variables for the rational-choice and social psychological models of voting. The
cross-over o f voting behavior variables begins in the Concrete Development Period
(1960-1976). This illustrates the integration of voting behavior models.
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Table 1
Summary o f Voting Behavior Indicators
Time Period

Rational-Choice

Social Psychological

Foundational Period

Monetary benefit from
policy or candidate

Personal income

Concrete Development
Period

Level o f education

Costs o f registering to
vote

Job status

Monetary benefit from
policy or candidate

Feelings toward
government and politics

Costs of registering to
vote

Party affiliation

Sense of civic duty
Modem Expansion
Period

Monetary benefit from
policy or candidate

Feelings toward
government and politics

Costs o f registering to
vote

Party affiliation

Sense of civic duty

Psychological sense of
community (PSC)

Information processing

To recapitulate the key findings of voting behavior studies, I will summarize
the development o f rational-choice and social psychological voting models.
Summary of Voting Behavior Models
Voting and election outcomes were first analyzed with sociological models
during the foundation period (pre 1960). Researchers examined the correlation
between the socioeconomic characteristics of voters and voter turnout. Higher
socioeconomic status is strongly correlated with higher turnout rates. The
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sociological model, however, failed to capture the psychological components of
voting. Cross-pressure was the psychological state found to occur within voters who
encountered conflicting political views among their socioeconomic characteristics.
This created within the voter a state o f voting dissonance which led the voter to
abstain from voting.
Sociological modeling offered little to campaign strategists when designing
campaign strategies. Measuring the political attitudes of the voter and attributing
them to the political party was later considered more important than examining the
correlation between socioeconomic characteristics of the voter and election turnout.
The study o f political attitudes would later become the focus o f most socialpsychological voting studies.
The study o f rational-choice voting debuts in the work o f Downs (1957).
Downs applied assumptions found in utility maximization theory to voter turnout. He
argued that voters support political candidates and policies from the political party
that provides the greatest economic retum-on-investment.
Political parties must converge on the median voter who has one-half of the
electorate to his or her left and one-half of the electorate to the right. The party must
then adopt policy platforms close to the position o f the median voter. This targeting
strategy will draw the median voter into the majority coalition.
A key concern to rational-choice theorists arose when voting and
participation were found to be irrational activities. Voters have to perceive that their
vote will significantly impact the election outcome before they will cast a ballot.
Mathematically, the probability o f one vote significantly impacting an election
outcome approaches zero as the electoral population increases. Therefore, voting and
participation are non-rational activities in large electorates. However, many voters
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still vote even though it is irrational to do so. This phenomenon is referred to as the
paradox o f voting.
As voting behavior research moved into the concrete development period
(1960-1976), much o f the research on voting and election outcomes was devoted to
measuring political attitudes, finding linkages between political attitudes and election
outcomes, and increasing the benefit differential among candidates and public
policies. This was accomplished primarily by redesigning the rational-choice model of
voting and constructing survey instruments that would measure political attitudes and
the importance o f political issues to the voter.
The paradox o f voting was addressed by adding a consumptive benefits term
to the rational model equation. Consumptive benefits include various forms of
satisfaction derived from voting. Feelings o f political efficacy and civic duty will
increase the likelihood o f voting. This, however, lead rational voting scholars into
another trap. If voting costs were greater than economic benefits and the probability
of one vote affecting the election were zero, voting and participation could be made
rational by habit and not by judgments about candidates.
Game-theory, factoring the closeness o f the election, and discarding “P”
altogether from the rational model were just a sample of the solutions offered during
this time-period to reconcile the paradox of voting. None of these solutions seemed
to solve the paradox, however, without eliminating the rational model altogether.
Voting behavior scholars would have to address voting costs, economic benefits, and
the significance o f the vote when designing rational models of voting.
Campaign strategists use rational-choice assumptions when designing election
strategies. Voters are enticed into the coalition that promises the greatest economic
retum-on-investment for the vote. Since voters cannot accurately estimate the impact
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o f their vote on the election outcome, the economic benefits of supporting a
candidate or policy have to be stressed.
Social psychological scholars grappled with survey validity and reliability
during the concrete development period. Furthermore, they realized that voters are
not atomized creatures. Voters develop political attitudes that are influenced by
economic factors and other macro-level variables. Examining the economic
environment o f the voter is necessary to explain voter attitudes toward political
candidates and policies. The context of the voter’s environment shapes his or her
political attitudes. Shaping behaviors, attitudes, and the degree o f issue importance
became the focus o f social psychological voting scholars.
To address these issues, social psychological scholars developed models that
simultaneously tunneled macro-level and micro-level variables into a decision to vote.
Identifying the determinants o f political attitudes and the shaping of those attitudes
into voter support for political candidates and policies came through the use of
questionnaires developed by social psychological scholars. The significance of
political parties diminished along with their impact on election outcomes. Voters
assess the candidate and the salience o f the issue when voting.
Campaign strategists must bond the candidate or issue with the voter and not
the party. If campaign strategists can develop an attribution of prosperity to the
candidate in the voter’s mind, this becomes another way they can alter the political
attitudes of the voter and influence the election outcome.
During the modem expansion period (1977-present), researchers somewhat
reconciled the paradox o f voting by accounting for information processing
capabilities of the voter and factoring altruism into the rational-choice model. For
example, Dunleavy (1991) argues:
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The informational pre-requisite o f choosing between parties are simpler than
those for potential interest group members. With very few parties or
candidates in competition being accorded saturation coverage by the mass
media, almost everyone is aware that the main parties exist and stand for
some distinctive policies. (Dunleavy, 1991, pp. 83-84)
Altruism, on the other hand, requires voters to estimate the economic benefits
and costs for other voters. When voters cannot accurately estimate costs for others,
they must alternatively perceive some form o f psychic benefits to guide them in their
ballot decisions (Mueller, 1989).
From the mid 1970s into the 1980s, researchers examined more closely the
effect of the economy on voting and electoral outcomes. Retrospective voting models
examined the attribution o f past economic conditions to incumbent candidates.
Prospective voting models examined the attribution o f perceived future economic
conditions on incumbent candidates during election contests. Research support for
models emphasizing retrospective voting is greater than support for prospective
voting in the voting literature.
Campaign strategists must bond candidates and policies with the voter. Not
only must they measure political attitudes within the voter, but campaign strategists
must also match those attitudes with the values of political candidates or policies.
Political attitudes are formed by many contextual elements, such as institutional
structures, the state o f the economy, and access to government officials. The
economic benefits o f selecting a candidate or policy must still exceed the costs of
voting and participation. Voters must feel attached to candidates and policies, and
believe that this attachment will bring about greater economic benefits to themselves
or the electorate.
Hatley and Croskey (1977) argued in the mid 1970s that a compelling need
existed to apply Congressional and presidential models of voting to the study of
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public school millage outcomes. This carry-over to school district millage elections
has produced mixed findings. The differences between school millage requests and
Congressional and presidential elections is most frequently cited as the reason.
For example, West (1991) argues that the nonpartisan nature o f school
millage elections poses a problem for modeling application. Party identification has
little relevance as a voting cue when voters are deciding whether or not to vote in
favor of the school millage. Partisanship plays a somewhat more important role in
political candidate elections. In addition, West (1991) argues that school millage
referenda create less of an information-gathering burden on voters and are therefore
less costly to support than candidates.
I believe that these arguments are somewhat weak because the research on
party identification and candidate support contradict West’s points. For example,
partisanship has played a lesser role in the research even on presidential and
Congressional election outcomes since the work o f Nie et al. (1976). Many voters
identify with candidates on a personal level based on their political values and
attitudes. Voting for the candidate and not the party has prevailed for over two
decades. My second critique o f West’s (1991) argument concerns his premise that
school millages have less o f an information- gathering burden.
School millages require voters to calculate economic benefits assuming they
understand questions o f taxation and budgeting. This creates more o f an informationgathering burden on voters because they must calculate the tax effects and budget
implications. Therefore, I see little support for the reduction of information-gathering
argument.
I believe that more substantive explanations exist. For example, the data base
compiled from National Election Studies on Congressional and presidential election
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outcomes is well established. The University of Michigan’s Institute for Social
Research and opinion polling organizations, such as Gallup, have a long history of
developing and perfecting a sound methodological system o f polling. There is no
national data base, however, o f local school millage election outcomes. Researchers
of school millage outcomes rely on survey instruments developed from a hybrid of
national election questionnaires. A more intuitive approach is used at the local school
district level. If one holds the assumptions about voting behavior constant, public
school superintendents should be able to determine school millage outcomes by using
rational-choice and social psychological voting analysis.
The findings on voting and school millage outcomes during the concrete
development and modem expansion periods parallel the findings on voting and
election outcomes for Congressional and Presidential candidates. Voters make
millage election decisions in the same way they do for Presidential and Congressional
elections. From a rational-choice perspective, the benefits obtained by supporting a
school millage must outweigh the costs of casting the ballot. The voter must see an
economic differential that justifies the cost of information-gathering and provide a
future payoffs to the voter. Rational-choice variables that reflect the economic
interests o f voters and increase the likelihood of support for the school millage
include median household income, education-level o f the school district, the school
district unemployment rate, and number of children in public schools.
The social psychological approach to explaining school millage outcomes
shows that political attitudes voters have toward their school district and the past
patterns o f millage support are just some of the factors having a strong impact on
school millage outcomes. Where these attitudes develop and how they affect school
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millage outcomes are reflective of the research findings on political socialization and
presidential and Congressional election outcomes.
In Chapter HI, I construct two logit models o f voting to explain school
millage outcomes in Michigan public school districts. They are: (1) a rational-choice
model, and (2) a social psychological model.
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CHAPTER HI
TWO LOGIT MODELS OF VOTING AND SCHOOL MILLAGE OUTCOMES
Why Logit Modeling?
I chose the logit modeling technique because of its appeal in “transforming
the problem o f predicting probabilities within a (0,1) interval to the problem o f
predicting the odds o f an event’s occurring within the range of the entire real line”
(Pindyck & Rubinfeld, 1981). Pindyck and Rubinfeld note that “changes in
independent variables will have their greatest impact on the probability of choosing a
given option at the mid-point o f the distribution” (p. 289).
Further evidence in support of the logit technique is offered by Wolfinger and
Rosenstone (1980) who state t hat " . . . the impact o f most demographic variables on
the probability o f voting is not constant across all types of individuals. Rather, the
effect o f a variable depends on the probability that the individual will vote . . . ”
(p. 11). Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) further explain that
the OLS (ordinary least squares) model assumes a linear relationship between
the parameters and the probability o f voting; a unit increase in an independent
variable has the same impact on the probability of voting, regardless o f the
values o f the other independent variables . . . with an OLS equation the
predicted probability o f voting will not necessarily be confirmed to the 0-1
interval. That is, with OLS some of the values of the independent variables
may yield estimated probabilities that are less than 0 or greater than 1.
(pp. 121-122)
With OLS,
the error variance is not constant across all observations and the variance of
the residuals will be small for predicted probabilities close to either 0 or I,
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while the variance will be much larger for predictions between .4 and . . As a
result, OLS estimates are inefficient. (Wolfinger & Rosenstone, 1980, p. 122)
6

Kramer (1983) argues that the tentative nature o f individual attitudes on issues such
as the economy make inferences from survey data risky. He states:
straight forward multiple regression. . . analysis o f vote intentions on a set o f
economic and control variables will not do the job and is likely to yield only
spurious estimates, which are virtually unrelated to the true effects. It would
therefore seem prudent to regard cautiously any finding in this area based on
individual-level survey d a ta . . . (p. 94)
With regard to using aggregate data versus survey methodologies, Kramer
(1983) states that “there is nothing inherently wrong or suspect about aggregate data,
and findings based on such data are not per se any more (or less) in need of
independent corroboration than those based on any other kind of data” (pp. 94-95).
Precautions of Inference
Before I test the three logit models, the ecological fallacy of inferring
individual behavior from aggregate data must be addressed. Several indicators in this
study tap macro-level dimensions o f voting, such as civilian unemployment, from
which I assert a relationship with support for a school millage referendum.
The plausibility of inferring individual behavior from macro-level data is
supported in the research o f Kramer (1983). He states that “the discrepancies
between the macro and micro-level studies are basically statistical artifact and do not
show any real disagreement about the true values of the underlying behavioral
parameters o f interest” (p. 93).
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Hypotheses
The previous discussion o f voting behavior models leads me to three
assertions. First, support for a school millage is a function o f the economic benefit
found in the school millage request. If voters perceive that a greater economic benefit
will come from supporting a public school millage than the cost of voting, they will
be more likely to support the millage request (Lankford, 1985; Piele & Hall, 1973;
Rubinfeld, 1977). For example, households with children who are o f elementary and
secondary public school age (5-17) will tend to increase the likelihood o f a public
school millage passing. This is attributed, in part, to a greater economic differential
associated with school-aged children and their future economic status.
The ethnicity of the school district is another factor from which we can
predict the likelihood o f the school millage passing. Ethnicity shapes the perception
o f the economic differential found in a school millage request. Voters o f ethnic
backgrounds find the short and long-term benefits of education to be associated with
an enhanced economic position in the future (Acock & Haley, 1975; Hahn & Almy,
1971; Piele & Hall, 1973).
Rational-Choice Voting and School Millage Outcomes
My first model provides estimates of the likelihood that six socioeconomic
characteristics o f the school district (median household income, level of education,
urbanization, households with children ages 5-17, school district unemployment, and
ethnicity) will have an impact on the success o f a school millage referendum. Six
hypotheses are constructed and then tested to determine the strength of rational-
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choice voting assumptions in estimating the likelihood of a public school millage
referendum passing. They are:
1

. Median household income. HqI Public school districts with higher median

household incomes will more likely see their school millages pass. Piele and Hall
(1973), Piele (1983), Giles et al. (1976), and Rubinfeld (1977) argue that median
household income reflects an ability to pay on behalf of the school district. Voters
understand that higher median household incomes are associated with school
education.
Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) concur with this assertion in their study o f
Congressional and presidential election turnout. Median household income is
operationalized here as the 1990 Census calculation of median household income per
Michigan public school district.
2. Levels o f education. H0: Public school districts with higher levels of
education among their residents will more likely see their school millage requests
pass. Persons with higher levels of education see the benefits of education more
clearly than those persons with lower levels of education. Furthermore, higher wages
are generally associated with higher levels o f education. Therefore, voters with higher
levels o f education will perceive a greater economic benefit differential from
supporting a school millage referendum.
This hypothesis is sustained in the school millage research of Piele and Hall
(1973) and Piele (1983). Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) concur with regard to
Congressional and presidential election turnout. Level of education is operationalized
as the number of residents determined by the 1990 Census to be living within a
Michigan public school district, 20 years or older, with (a) a 12th grade or less/no
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diploma level o f education, or (b) a completed high school diploma, or (c) some
college but no degree, or (d) a bachelor degree or higher.
3. Urbanization. Hq. Residents who reside in rural areas of a school district
will be less likely to support a school millage request. Piele and Hall (1973) argue
that rural areas contain residents o f less diverse ethnic backgrounds and o f a more
conservative ideology than residents living within urban areas. Therefore, support for
a school millage request is less likely to come from rural areas.
Urbanization is operationalized as the number o f persons, as determined by
the 1990 Census, within a Michigan public school district who reside (a) inside urban
areas, or (b) outside urban areas, or (c) in rural farm areas, or (d) in nonfarm rural
areas.
4. Households with children ages 5-17. H0: As the number o f households
with children ages 5-17 increases, so will the likelihood of a school millage request
passing. Piele and Hall (1973), Giles et al. (1976), and Rubinfeld (1977) show that
voters with school aged children have a greater likelihood of supporting a public
school millage request.
Households with children ages 5-17 are operationalized as the number of
households within a Michigan public school district, as determined by the 1990
Census, with children 5-17 years old.
5. Ethnicity o f the school district. HqI As the number of ethnic minorities
within a public school district increases, so will the likelihood of the school millage
request passing. Ethnic minorities have more to gain in both short-term (improved
school conditions) and long-term (improved status) benefits from a successful school
millage outcome, according to Piele and Hall (1973), Jennings (1973), and Piele
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(1983). Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) concur with this finding in their analysis of
Congressional and presidential election turnout.
Ethnicity is operationalized by the 1990 Census as the number o f (a) nonHispanic Caucasian persons, (b) non-Hispanic Black persons, (c) Native American
persons, (d) Asian or Pacific Islander persons, and (e) persons non-Hispanic/other
living within a Michigan public school district.
6

.

School district unemployment. H0: As the number o f unemployed

individuals within the public school district increases, the less likely it is that a public
school millage referendum will pass. Residents o f the local school district foresee
greater costs associated with supporting a public school millage request when they
are unemployed. Unemployed residents receive little payoff from a school millage
unless their support for the millage brings them benefits such as job training.
The impact o f state and federal economic conditions on election outcomes is
strong in the research on Congressional and presidential election outcomes. Several
studies (e.g., Fair, 1978; Kuklinski & West, 1981; Lewis-Beck, 1988; Lockerbie,
1991) find that the state of the economy has a strong impact on election outcomes.
Davidson and Cotter (1993) and Lankford (1985) concur in their analysis and
findings on employment conditions and public school millage outcomes.
I operationalize public school district unemployment as the number of
persons, determined by the 1990 Census, 16 years of age or older in a Michigan
public school district defined as unemployed.
The relationship between the economic interests of the school district and the
likelihood of the school millage request passing is expressed in the following logit
equation:
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where: M , = rational-choice logit model;
L, = the logit or the log o f the odds ratio, where “Prob (millage)” represents
the probability o f a voter supporting the school millage referendum;
B = constant;
0

B,...B = the standardized coefficients for rational- choice variables R,
7

through R7;
R, = 1990 median household income within the Michigan public school
district (MEDHOI90);
R = 1990 level o f education of residents 20 years of age or older in Michigan
2

public school districts (NODIP90, DIPLOM90, SOMECO90, & GRADU90);
R = 1990 urbanization o f residents in Michigan public school districts
3

(PERURB90, PERURO90, PERFAR90, & PERNOF90);
R = 1990 Households with children ages 5-17 (HOKIDS90);
4

Rs = 1990 ethnicity o f residents in Michigan public school districts
(CAUCA90 and MINORI90);
1990 Michigan public school district unemployment (CIVUNM90).
Data for the rational-choice logit model were obtained from the National Center for
Education Statistics (1995) and the Michigan Department o f Education (1996).
The dependent variable in the rational-choice logit model is the June millage
request for the years 1990, 1991, and 1992. The millage request variable is
operationalized in a dichotomous form as

1

= the millage request passed, or

0

= the
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millage request failed. Data for the dependent variable were obtained from the
Michigan Department o f Education (1996).
My second assertion is derived from the social psychological model o f voting.
Support for the school millage is a function of the level of previous support in local
school millage elections. Positive attitudes toward the school district are reflected in
trends such as past patterns o f millage support (Hall & Piele, 1976). Higher levels o f
commitment to the school district will increase the likelihood o f a school millage
request passing (Piele & Hall, 1973).
My third assertion is a cross-over of the two primary voting models but is
tested as a social psychological factor. I believe that a request for a millage renewal
has a greater likelihood o f support than a request for additional mills (Piele & Hall,
1973). This I attribute, in part, to the notion that voters reach a monetary threshold
o f support for their school district which diminishes as the number of millage requests
increases (Lankford, 1985).
Social Psychological Voting and School Millage Outcomes
The social psychological logit model provides an estimate of support for the
school millage request by analyzing two dimensions of Michigan public school district
residents. They are: (1) commitment by residents to their respective school systems,
and (2) the amount of millage renewal or increase sought. Commitment to the school
system is measured by calculating the ratio of millage referenda requested to millage
referenda passed. The closer the ratio is to 100%, the more committed the school
district residents are to their respective school systems. The second dimension o f the
social psychological logit model is the amount of the millage request. The amount of
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millage request refers to the amount o f millage renewal or increase requested by the
local public school board.
The social psychological logit model poses some interesting challenges and
limitations with regard to data collection. Unlike the National Election Studies, in the
case of Presidential and Congressional elections, there are no national data bases o f
political attitudes collected by researchers using survey research methods to measure
the attitudes o f local public school district residents. The nature of this study limits
the use o f the survey research and explains why issue salience is not addressed.
In order to reconstruct the political attitudes of voters in each June millage
election, for example, I would have to mail questionnaires to residents and require
them to recollect their feelings from over five years ago. Sampling poses another
issue. I would have to assume zero mobility by Michigan residents if I were to
accurately capture the feelings o f voters in their environment during the millage
election. Citizens, however, do move to other school districts which makes
contacting them very difficult. Furthermore, Duncan (1981) explains that
measurement problems can arise when comparing attitudes across groups. For
example, attitudes among group members are affected by different factors within an
individual’s environment. To assume that the attitudes in one environment are
affected by the same dynamics in another environment creates an unreasonable
assumption about variations among group member attitudes. Attitudes held by one
group cannot be extrapolated to another unless both groups interact in the same
environmental context.
The only feasible solution for addressing these issues is to use a proxy
indicator of political attitudes. Kramer (1983) argues that the use of proxy measures
is no less statistically valid than the use of actual surveys. He maintains that

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

51
“individual-level survey data, at least when analyzed with the usual methods, are not
really very useful for studying the effects o f short-term economic fluctuations on
individual voting decisions” (p. 94).
While support does exist for the use of proxy indicators, there are important
limitations to their use. For example, proxy indicators attempt to capture multiple
dimensions o f a concept with one measure. Nevertheless, due to the necessity o f
measuring some form o f political attitudes, I use one proxy indicator, commitment to
the school district, as a measure of positive attitudes o f voters toward the school
system.
I construct the following hypotheses, albeit moderate in strength, to test
social psychological assumptions of voting and public school millage outcomes:
1

. Commitment to school system. Hq: The closer to 100% the millage success

ratio is, the more likely it is that the public school millage request will pass. Piele and
Hall (1973), Rubinfeld (1977), and Hall and Piele (1976) show this assumption to be
consistent in the research on school millage outcomes. Wolfinger and Rosenthal
(1980) also support this assumption when analyzing Congressional and Presidential
election outcomes. The more a political party successfully attains electoral office in
each election, the more likely it is to attain office in the next election. Commitment to
the school system is operationalized as the ratio o f the number o f millage referenda
requested to the number o f millage referenda passed.
2. Millage renewal. Hq.' As the amount requested for a school millage
renewal increases, the likelihood of support for the school millage referendum will
decrease. Voters will be more likely to support a school millage if the number of mills
levied remains unchanged. There is no added economic burden to the voter unless,
for example, that person’s median household income decreases, one’s personal

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

52
income tax increases, or other voting costs increase. I operationalize the amount o f
the school millage renewal as the amount requested by the local Michigan public
school board for a school millage.
3.

Millage increase. HqI As the amount requested for a school millage

increases, the likelihood o f the millage passing will decrease. The ability to pay more
taxes reaches a threshold. When the school tax requested then increases, voters must
see greater benefit differentials to off-set the increased cost to the voter. This
assertion is supported in the research of Piele (1983). Millage increase is
operationalized as the amount requested for an increase in the current number o f mills
levied.
Some studies (Piele & Hall, 1973) have analyzed millage content by
examining the wording of the millage referendum. Piele and Hall (1973) find that the
purpose of the millage has no significant effect on support from the electorate.
However, a greater methodological limitation exists for this study in analyzing the
effect of the school millage content.
In order to replicate the research of Piele and Hall and others, I would have to
obtain the original school referenda from over 400 Michigan public school districts.
This would require the author to content analyze over 1,200 pieces of legislation over
the three periods (1990-1992). Therefore, I correct for this prohibitive workload by
finding a next best method. That is to analyze the face effect of the amount o f the
proposed millage, as either a renewal or increase, on its success at the polls.
The dependent variable in the social psychological logit model is: (a) passage
o f the June millage request for years 1990, 1991, and 1992 (PASS90, PASS91, and
PASS92). Data were made available for the social psychological variables from the
Michigan Department of Education (1996).
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The relationship between the social psychological dimension of commitment
to the school system and support for the school millage request is expressed in the
following logit equation:

Prob(millage)
M, = L, = lo g -----------------1 - Prob(millage)
= B + BjS, + B S] + B S
0

2

3

3

where: M = social psychological logit model;
2

L, = the logit or the log of the odds ratio, where “Prob (millage)” represents
the probability o f a voter supporting the school millage referendum;
B = constant;
0

B(...B = the standardized coefficient for social psychological variables
3

S -.-S3;
1

S, = commitment to school system ratio (SURAT91 and SURAT92);
5 = amount o f millage renewal (RENEW90, RENEW91, and RENEW92);
2

5 = amount o f millage increase (ADDIT90, ADDIT91, and ADDIT92).
3

Each model is estimated for a three-year period (1990-1992). My unit of
analysis is Michigan (K-12) public school districts. Every public school district that
placed a school millage request on the June ballot between 1990 and 1992 is
analyzed A complete listing o f the variables used in this study is provided in the
.2

Appendix A.
Controlling for District Size
An additional objective o f this study is to determine if the size o f the school
district, in terms o f pupil count, matters when estimating support for a school millage
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referendum. Lankford (1985) and Henry (1987) show that student enrollment affects
school millage outcomes. To test this proposition, I control for the size o f the school
district in terms o f the number o f students who were counted during the state’s
official student count day.
Classifying Michigan public school districts by their size was determined by
the classification schemes offered by Educational Research Service, Inc. (1986,
1987). Very small school districts are operationalized as those having one to 2,499
students. Small school districts are operationalized as having 2,500-9,999 students.
Medium-sized school districts have 10,000-24,999 students while a large school
district is operationalized as having 25,000 or more students.
The size o f the school district was recoded into an ordinal scale o f I = very
small, 2 = small, 3 = medium, and 4 = large. The variable SIZE is controlled for in
each o f the two logit models.
Linking the Logit Estimates
Profiling the rational-choice and social psychological logit estimates will
provide public school superintendents with a more robust explanation o f school
millage outcomes. For example, if increases in levels of education and commitment to
the school system, along with the school board’s request for a millage renewal
decrease the likelihood o f support for a school millage referendum, the
superintendent may need to consider launching a campaign to build confidence in the
voters about the capability of school officials.
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CHAPTER IV
THE FINDINGS
Intercorrelation
The correlation matrix presented in Table 2 shows little or no intercorrelation
among the independent variables. The correlations that do exist, however, are
expected and reflect the correlations found by Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) in
their research on voting and presidential and Congressional elections. Overall, the
following correlations exist among the independent variables.
Median Household Income
Median household income is negative or weak in correlation with
urbanization, ethnicity, number o f households with children ages 5-17, and school
district unemployment. The correlations that exist are expected. For example, median
household income is reflective o f an individual’s level of education. Higher levels of
education are correlated with higher median household incomes.
Ethnicity
Negative or weak correlations exist between the ethnicity of the school
district, median household income, urbanization (persons living in non-urban areas),
and school district employment level. However, stronger correlations exist between
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Coefficients of Intercorrelation. Independent Variables

MEDHOI90

MEDHO190

1 .0 0 0 0

(561)
P=.
HOKIDS90

PERURO90

PERFAR90

PERURB90

PERNOF90

.0886
(561)
P=.036*

HOKIDS90

PERURO90

PERFAR90

PERURB90

PERNOF9

.0886
(561)
P=036*

.0086
(561)
P=840

.0484
(561)
P=.253

.0851
(561)
P=.044*

.1197
(561)
P=.005*

.0349
(561)
P=.410

-.0736
(561)

.9845
(561)
P=.000*

-.0108
(561)
P=.799

.1455
(561)
P=00P

.0755
(561)
P=.074

.3681
(561)
P=.000*

-.1463
(561)
P=.001*

.4621
(561)
P=.000*

1 .0 0 0 0

(561)
P=.

00

Variable

II
o
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Table 2

.0086
(561)
P=.840

.0349
(561)
P=.410

.0484
(561)
P=.253

-.0736
(561)
P=.081

.1455
(561)
P=001*

.0851
(561)
P=.044*

.9845
(561)
p=.ooo*

-.0755
(561)
P=.074

-1463
(561)
P=.001*

.1197
(561)
P=.005*

-.0108
(561)
P=.799

.3681
(561)
P=000*

.4621
(561)
P=.000*

1 .0 0 0 0

(561)
P=.

1 .0 0 0 0

(561)
P=.

1 .0 0 0 0

(561)
P=.
-.1478
(561)
P=000*

.1478
(561)
p=.ooo*
1 .0 0 0 0

(561)
P=.

ON
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Table 2—Continued
Variable

MEDHOI90

HOKIDS90

PERURO90

PERFAR90

PERURB90

PERNOF90

CAUCAS90

.3288
(561)
P=.000*

.7332
(561)
P=.000*

.1217
(561)
P=,004*

-.1141
(561)
P=,007*

.7529
(561)
p=.ooo*

.0492
(561)
P=,244

AFRAM90

-.0573
(561)
P=.175

.9442
(561)
P=.000*

-.0216
(561)
P=,610

-.0516
(561)
P=.222

.9227
(561)
P=000*

.0583
(561)
P=.168

NATIVE90

-.0593
(561)
P=,l l

.7113
(561)
P=000*

.1917
(561)
p=.ooo*

-.1161
(561)
P=.006*

.6958
(561)
P=.000*

.0288
(561)
P=.496

ASIAN90

.2445
(561)
P=000*

.6635
(561)
P=000*

-.0224
(561)
P=597

-.1389
(561)
P=.001*

.7135
(561)
P = 0 00*

-.1096
(561)
P=.009*

NOHISO90

-.0265
(561)
P=.531

.9360
(561)
P=.000*

-.0155
(561)
P=, 714

-.0920
(561)
P=.029*

.9376
(561)
P=.000*

-.0853
(561)
P=.043*

HISPAN90

-.0012
(561)
P=.977

.9169
(561)
P=000*

.0047
(561)
P=.912

-.0749
(561)
P=076

.9160
(561)
p=.ooo*

-.0599
(561)
P=. 157

CIVEMP90

.1880
(561)
P=000*

.9649
(561)
P=000*

.0466
(561)
P=.270

-.1059
(561)
P=012*

.9698
(561)
p=.ooo*

-.0185
(561)
P=662

6

PERURO90

PERFAR90

PERURB90

PERNOF90

CIVUNM90

-.0255
(561)
P=,547

.9785
(561)
P=000*

.0061
(561)
P

-.0602
(561)
P=.154

.9594
(561)
P=.000*

-.0377
(561)
P=.373

NODIP90

-.0137
(561)
P=746

.9838
(561)
P=000*

.0068
(561)

-.0655
(561)
P=.121

.9671
(561)
P=000*

-.0412
(561)
P=.331

DIPLOM90

.0830
(561)
P=.049*

.9908
(561)
P=.000*

.0424
(561)
P=.316

-.0747
(561)
P=.077

.9782
(561)
p=.ooo*

-.0042
(561)
P=.920

SOMECO90

.1489
(561)
P=.000*

.9755
(561)
P=.000*

.0484
(561)
P=253

-.1057
(561)
P=012*

.9777
(561)
p=.ooo*

-.0195
(561)
P=,644

GRADU90

.3367
(561)
P=.000*

.7290
(561)
P=.000*

.0524
(561)
P=,216

-.1452
(561)

.7669
(561)
p=.ooo*

-.0449
(561)
P=288

= .8 8 6

00
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HOKIDS90
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Table 2—Continued
CAUCAS90

AFRAM90

NATIVE90

ASIAN90

NOHISO90

.3288
(561)
P=.000*

-.0573
(561)
P=. 175

-.0593
(561)
P=. 161

.2445
(561)
P=,000*

-.0265
(561)
P=531

(561)
P=.977

HOKIDS90

.7332
(561)
P=.000*

.9442
(561)
P=000*

.7113
(561)
P=.000*

.6635
(561)
p=.ooo*

.9360
(561)
P=.000*

.9169
(561)
P=000*

PERURO90

.1217
(561)
P=.004*

-.0216
(561)
P=. 610

.1917
(561)
p=.ooo*

-.0224
(561)
P=. 597

-.0155
(561)
P=.714

.0047
(561)
P=912

PERFAR90

-.1141
(561)
P=.007*

-.0516
(561)
P=222

-.1161
(561)
P=.006*

-.1389
(561)
P=001*

-.0920
(561)
P=.029*

-.0749
(561)
P=,076*

PERURB90

.7529
(561)
P=.000*

.9227
(561)
P=.000*

.6958
(561)
P=000*

.7135
(561)
P=000*

.9376
(561)
P=.000*

.9160
(561)
P=.000*

PERNOF90

.0492
(561)
P=.244

-.0583
(561)
P=.168

.0288
(561)
P=496

-.1096
(561)
P=,009*

-.0853
(561)
P=.043*

-.0599
(561)
P=.157

CAUCAS90

1.0000
(561)
P=.

.4754
(561
P=000*

.6218
(561)
P=000*

.7525
(561)
p=.ooo*

.6518
(561)
P=.000*

.6846
(561)
P=000*

MEDHOI90

HISPAN90

- .0 0 1 2

L /t

so
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Table 2— Continued
CAUCAS90

AFRAM90

NATIVE90

ASIAN90

NOHISO90

HISPAN90

AFRAM90

.4754
(561)
P=.000*

1.0000
(561)
P=.

.6226
(561)
P=000*

.5250
(561)
p=.ooo*

.9069
(561)
p=.ooo*

.8603
(561)
P=,000*

NAT1VE90

.6218
(561)
P=.000*

.6226
(561)
P=.000*

.4656
(561)
P=000*

.7116
(561)
P=000*

.7224
(561)
P=000*

.7515
(561)
P=.000*

.5250
(561)
P=.000*

.4655
(561)
P=.000*

.6526
(561)
P=.000*

.6238
(561)
P=.000*

.6518
(651)
P=.000*

.9069
(561)
P=.000*

.7116
(561)
P=000*

.6526
(561)
P=.000*

.6846
(561)
P=.000*

.8603
(561)
P=.000*

.7224
(561)
P=.000*

CIVEMP90

.8744
(561)
P=.000*

.8380
(561)
P=.000*

CIVUNM90

.5892
(561)
P=000*

.9887
(561)
P=.000*

ASIAN90

NOHISO90

HISPAN90

1 .0 0 0 0

(561)
P=.

1 .0 0 0 0

(561)
P=.

(561)
P=.

.9457
(561)
p=.ooo*

.6238
(561)
p=.ooo*

.9457
(561)
p=.ooo*

(561)
P=.

.7162
(561)
P=.000*

.7795
(561)
P=.000*

.9015
(561)
P=.000*

.8924
(561)
P=.000*

.6779
(561)
P=.000*

.5788
(561)
p=.ooo*

.9313
(561)
P=000*

.8996
(561)
P=,000*

1 .0 0 0 0

1 .0 0 0

On

o
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Table 2—Continued
CAUCAS90

AFRAM90

NATIVE90

ASIAN90

NOHISO90

HISPAN90

NODIP90

.6252
(561)
p=.ooo*

.9778
(561)
p=.ooo*

.6919
(561)
p=.ooo*

.5763
(561)
p=.ooo*

.9006
(561)
P=.00D*

.9071
(561)
P=.000»

DIPLOM90

.7731
(561)
p=.ooo*

.9138
(561)
P=.000*

.7249
(561)
p=.ooo*

.6376
(561)
p=.ooo*

.9176
(561)
p=.ooo*

.9103
(561)
P=.000*

SOMECO90

.8420
(561)
P=.000*

.8686
(561)
P=.000*

.7246
(561)
P=.000*

.7526
(561)
p=.ooo*

.9176
(561)
p=.ooo*

.9043
(561)
P=.000*

GRADU90

.8622
(561)
P=.000*

.5540
(561)
p=.ooo*

.5316
(561)
p=.ooo*

.9274
(561)
p=.ooo*

.6934
(561)
P=000*

.6724
(561)
P=.000*

ON
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Table 2—Continued
CIVEMP90

CIVUNM90

NODIP90

DIPLOM90

SOMECO90

GRADU90

MEDHOI90

.1880
(561)
P=.000*

-.0255
(561)
P=,547

-.0137
(561)
P=.746

.0830
(561)
P=.049*

.1489
(561)
P=.000*

.3367
(561)
p=.ooo*

HOKIDS90

.9649
(561)
P=.000*

.9785
(561)
P=.000*

.9838
(561)
P=.000*

.9908
(561)
P=.000*

.9755
(561)
P=000*

.7290
(561)
P=,000*

PERURO90

.0466
(561)
P=.270

.0061
(561)
P

.0068
(561)
P=873

.0424
(561)
P=.316

.0484
(561)
P=.253

.0524
(561)
P=216

PERFAR90

-.1059
(561)
P=012*

-.0602
(561)
P=. 154

-.0655
(561)
P=. 121

-.0747
(561)
P=.077

-.1057
(561)
P=.012*

-.1452
(561)
P=001*

PERURB90

.9698
(561)
P=000*

.9594
(561)
P=,000*

.9671
(561)
P=000*

.9782
(561)
p=.ooo*

.9777
(561)
p=.ooo*

.7669
(561)
P=.000*

PERNOF90

-.0185
(561)
P=.662

-.0377
(561)
P=.373

-.0412
(561)
P= 331

-.0042
(561)
P=.920

-.0195
(561)
P=.644

-.0449
(561)
P=288

CAUCAS90

.8744
(561)
P=.000*

.5892
(561)
P=000*

.6252
(561)
P=.000*

.7731
(561)
p=ooo*

.8420
(561)
p=.ooo*

.8622
(561)
P=,000*

=

8 8 6
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Table 2—Continued
CIVEMP90

CIVUNM90

NODIP90

DIPLOM90

SOMECO90

GRADU90

AFRAM90

.8380
(651)
p=.ooo*

.9887
(561)
p=.ooo*

.9778
(561)
P=.000*

.9138
(561)
p=.ooo*

.8686
(561)
P=.000*

.5540
(561)
p=.ooo*

NATIVE90

.7162
(561)
P=.000*

.6779
(561)
p=.ooo*

.6919
(561)
P=.000*

.7249
(561)
P=.000*

.7246
(561)
P=.000*

.5316
(561)
p=.ooo*

ASIAN90

.7795
(561)
p=.ooo*

.5788
(561)
p=.ooo*

.5763
(561)
p=ooo*

.6376
(561)
P=.000*

.7526
(561)
p=.000*

.9274
(561)
p=,ooo*

NOHIS090

.9015
(561)
p=.ooo*

.9313
(561)
p=.ooo*

.9306
(561)
P=.000*

.9176
(561)
P=,000*

.9176
(561)
P=000*

.6934
(561)
P=000*

HISPAN90

.8924
(561)
P=000*

.8996
(561)
P=000*

.0071
(561)
P=000*

.9103
(561)
P=.000*

.9043
(561)
P=.000*

.6724
(561)
P=.000*

CIVEMP90

1.0000
(561)
P=.

.8989
(561)
p=.ooo*

.9132
(561)
P=.000*

.9687
(561)
P=000*

.9948
(561)
P=000*

.8546
(561)
P=000*

CIVUNM90

.8989
(561)
p=.ooo*

1.0000
(561)
P=.

.9956
(561)
p=.ooo*

.9602
(561)
P=,000*

.9240
(561)
P=,000*

.6200
(561)
p=.ooo*
o\

Ui
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Table 2— Continued
CIVEMP90

CIVUNM90

NODIP90

DIPLOM90

SOMECO90

GRADU90

NODIP90

.9132
(561)
p=.ooo*

.9956
(561)
p=.ooo*

1.0000
(561)
P=.

.9748
(561)
P=.000*

.9335
(561)
P=.000*

.6248
(561)
P=.000*

DIPLOM90

.9687
(561)
p=.ooo*

.9602
(561)
p=.ooo*

.9748
(561)
P=.000*

1.0000
(561)
P=.

.9764
(561)
P=.000*

.7117
(561)
P=.000*

SOMECO90

.9948
(561)
p=.ooo*

.9240
(561)
P=.000*

.9335
(561)
P=.000*

.9764
(561)
P=000*

1.0000
(561)
P=.

.8250
(561)
P=,000*

.8546
(561)
P=.00D*

.6200
(561)
P=000*

.6248
(561)
P=.000*

.7117
(561)
P=000*

.8250
(561)
P=.000*

1.0000
(561)
P=.

GRADU90

* *.* is printed if a coefficient cannot be computed.
* Significant at the .05 level.

65
ethnicity o f the school district and persons living in urban areas and higher levels o f
education.
Urbanization
There is a weak or zero correlation between the urbanization o f the school
district and median household income. Stronger negative and positive correlations
exist between the urbanization o f the school district and levels of education.
School District Employment
Strong correlations exist between school district employment and
unemployment rates and levels of education. This finding is expected, given that
employment is a function o f education levels.
The variables in this study pose no problem with regard to intercorrelation.
All statistically significant correlations are either weak, negative, or expected.
Therefore, the variables used for this analysis are valid and reliable indicators of the
concepts they measure. The next stage of my data analysis involves interpreting the
logit model coefficients.
The Rational-Choice Model Logit Coefficients
June Millage Elections 1990
Table 3 shows the outcome from the rational-choice analysis for the June
1990 millage elections. The overall model predicted 78% of the school millage
outcomes correctly. When we use th e . 10 level of significance, we find that an
association does exist between median household income, households with children
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Table 3
Likelihood o f Rational-Choice Voting Characteristics Predicting
School Millage Outcomes in June o f 1990
Variable

B

Median
household income
1990
Households w/
children ages
5-17 1990
Persons living
inside urban areas
1990
Persons living
outside urban
areas 1990
Persons—rural
farm 1990
Persons—rural
non-farm 1990
Persons
non-Hispanic
White 1990

-1.8E-05

.0017

S.E.

Wald

df

2.495E-05

.5498

I

.4584

.0 0 0 0

1 .0 0 0 0

2.2158

1

.1366

.0254

1.0017

.0 0 1 2

Sig

R

Exp(B)

- .0 0 0 1

.0004

.1053

1

.7456

.0 0 0 0

.9999

- .0 0 0 2

.0004

.1988

1

.6557

.0 0 0 0

.9998

.0007

3.3622

I

.0667

.0639

.0004

.2069

I

.6492

.0 0 0 0

.0 0 0 1

.1227

1

.7261

.0 0 0 0

.0013
- .0 0 0 2

5.19E-05

1.0013
.9998
1 .0 0 0 1

Minority
population 1990

-.6593

1.0976

.3608

1

.5481

.0 0 0 0

.5172

Size of the school
district 1990

-.1225

.5638

.0472

1

.8280

.0 0 0 0

.8847

Persons 20 years
or older w/
grade or less w/
no diploma 1990

-.0006

.0007

.7058

1

.4008

.0 0 0 0

.9994

- .0 0 0 2

.0006

.0692

1

.7925

.0 0 0 0

.9998

1 2

Persons 20 years
or older w/ a high
school diploma
1990
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Table 3—Continued
Variable

B

Persons 20 years
or older w/ some
college but no
degree 1990

-.0002

.0007

.6078

1

.8054

.0000

.9998

Persons 20 years
or older w/a
bachelor degree
or higher 1990

.0001

.0005

.0518

1

.8200

.0000

1.0001

Civilians
unemployed 1990

.0013

.0013

1.0237

I

.3117

.0000

1.0013

2.6456

1.3561

3.8059

1

.0511

Constant

S.E.

Wald

df

Sig

R

Exp(B)

Overall performance of the rational-choice model
Percent of school millage elections
correctly predicted in June of 1990 =

78.10%

X2 = 21.739
df = 14
Sig. = .0841
between ages 5-17, urbanization, ethnicity, education levels within the school
district, the size o f the school district, and whether or not a school millage passes
(sig. = .08).
When examining the independent variables as determinants of the likelihood
that the school millage will pass, we find that the number of persons within the school
district living in farm areas (sig. = .07) has the greatest impact on the success of a
school millage request during the June 1990 millage elections. This finding parallels
that of the research by Piele and Hail (1973), Giles et al. (1976), and Rubinfeld
(1977). Here we find that for every one-unit increase in the number of persons living
in farm areas, the log-odds increase in favor of the millage passing by .0013%.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

68
There is very little or no intercorrelation among the independent variables in
this model. Therefore, we can safely assume that median household income, levels of
education, urbanization, households with children ages 5-17, ethnicity o f the school
district, and school district unemployment would have independent effects on the
outcome o f the millage election for this time-period.
June Millage Elections 1991
The rational-choice model does not perform as well in explaining school
millage outcomes for the year 1991 as it did for the year 1990. Table 4 shows a
marginal increase o f 1% in the model’s predictive capacity from 1990. Overall, 79%
of the millage elections during the month of June in 1991 were correctly predicted by
the rational-choice model compared to 77% in 1990. However, no single variable
within the rational-choice model for 1991 is statistically significant in increasing the
likelihood o f the school millage passing.
The Pearson r coefficients show no intercorrelation among the independent
variables within the rational-choice model for the June 1991 school millage elections.
June Millage Elections 1992
The rational-choice model performs exceptionally well when analyzing school
millage outcomes in June o f 1992 when compared to the previous two years. Table 5
shows that the model correctly predicts

8 8

% o f the school millage elections for that

year. While an association does exist between all independent variables within the
model and school millage outcomes (sig. = .04), no variable alone is statistically
significant in predicting a school millage outcome.
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Table 4
Likelihood o f Rational-Choice Voting Characteristics Predicting
School Millage Outcomes in June of 1991
Variable

B

S.E.

Wald

df

-3.1E-05

2.756E-05

1.2572

1

.0013

.0017

Persons living
inside urban areas
1990

-.0005

Persons living
outside urban
areas 1990

Median
household income
1990

Sig

R

Exp (B)

.2622

.0 0 0 0

1 .0 0 0 0

.5883

.4431

.0000

1.0013

.0006

.5710

.4499

.0000

.9995

-.0005

.0006

.6112

.4343

.0000

.9995

Persons—rural
farm 1990

.0004

.0008

.2837

.5943

.0000

1.0004

Persons—rural
non-farm 1990

-.0005

.0006

.6506

.4199

.0000

.9995

Persons
non-Hispanic
White 1990

5.4E-05

.0002

.0483

.8261

.0 0 0 0

.9999

Minority
population 1990

-5.6324

13.8128

.1663

.6834

.0000

.0036

Size of the school
district 1990

.1447

.5471

.0699

.7915

.0000

1.1557

Persons 20 years
or older w/
grade or less w/
no diploma 1990

-.0009

.0008

1.2146

.2704

.0000

1.0009

Persons 20 years
or older w/ a high
school diploma
1990

-6.0E-05

.0007

.0075

.9309

.0000

.9999

Households w/
children ages
5-17 1990

1 2

I
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Table 4— Continued
Variable

S.E.

B

Wald

df

Sig

R

Exp (B)

Persons 20 years
or older w/ some
college but no
degree 1990

.0006

.0009

.5433

1

.4611

.0000

1.0006

Persons 20 years
or older w/ a
bachelor degree
or higher 1990

.0008

.0006

1.5538

I

.2126

.0000

1.0008

Civilians
unemployed 1990

.0006

.0016

.1611

I

.6881

.0000

1.0006

7.8620

13.8414

.3226

1

.5700

Constant

Overall performance of the rational-choice model
Percent of school millage elections
correctly predicted in June of 1991 =

79.26%

X2 = 14.337
df = 14
Sig. = .4249

Intercorrelation within the rational-choice model is minimal for the 1992
school millage analysis. The Pearson r coefficients show very weak correlations
among the independent variables within the model.
Social Psychological Model Logit Coefficients
June Millage Elections 1990
The social psychological model performs similarly to the rational-choice
model when predicting school millage outcomes during the month of June in 1990.
Table

6

shows that 79% of the school millage elections during June of 1990 were
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Table 5
Likelihood of Rational-Choice Voting Characteristics Predicting
School Millage Outcomes in June of 1992
Variable

B

Median
household income
1990

2.82E-05

R

S.E.

Wald

df

3.237E-05

.7588

I

.3837

.0 0 0 0

1.9108

1

.1669

.0 0 0 0

.9971

Sig

Exp (B)

1 .0 0 0 0

Households w/
children ages
5-17 1990

-.0029

Persons living
inside urban areas
1990

.0006

.0008

.5502

1

.4583

.0 0 0 0

1.0006

Persons living
outside urban
areas 1990

.0006

.0008

.6522

1

.4193

.0 0 0 0

1.0006

Persons—rural
farm 1990

.0007

.0 0 1 1

.4108

1

.5215

.0 0 0 0

1.0007

Persons—rural
non-farm 1990

-.0005

.0008

.4967

1

.4810

.0 0 0 0

1.0005

Persons
non-Hispanic
White 1990

-4.2E-05

.0003

.0266

I

.8703

.0 0 0 0

1.0000

Minority
population 1990

-4.4380

16.3717

.0735

I

.7863

.0 0 0 0

.0118

Size of the school
district 1990

-.4297

.7408

.3364

1

.5619

.0 0 0 0

.6507

- .0 0 1 0

.0 0 1 1

.8402

1

.3594

.0 0 0 0

.9990

-.0004

.0 0 1 0

.1137

1

.7360

.0 0 0 0

.9996

Persons 20 years
or older w
grade or less w/
no diploma 1990
/

.0 0 2 1

1 2

Persons 20 years
or older w/ a high
school diploma
1990
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Table 5— Continued
Variable

B

Persons 20 years
or older w/ some
college but no
degree 1990

-.0005

.0011

.2480

1

.6181

.0000

.9995

Persons 20 years
or older w/ a
bachelor degree
or higher 1990

.0002

.0009

.0284

1

.8661

.0000

.9998

Civilians
unemployed 1990

.0033

.0019

3.0419

1

.0811

.0714

1.0033

6.8454

16.4008

.1742

1

.6764

Constant

S.E.

Wald

df

Sig

Exp (B)

R

Overall performance of the rational-choice model
Percent of school millage elections
correctly predicted in June of 1992 =

88.10%

X' = 24.586
df = 14
Sig. = .0389
correctly predicted by the model. Overall, we find that an association does exist
between the amount of a school millage renewal requested, the amount of additional
mills requested, the size o f the public school district, and the outcome of the school
millage election (sig. = <

0 0 1

).

We tested for the independent effects of the size of the school district, the
amount o f millage renewal requested, and the number of additional mills requested on
school millage outcomes. The findings show that: (a) as the amount of renewal
increases, the likelihood o f the school millage passing increases (sig. = <.

0 0 1

), and

(b) as the amount of additional mills requested increases, the likelihood o f the school
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Table 6
Likelihood o f Social Psychological Voting Characteristics Predicting
School Millage Outcomes in June o f 1990
Variable

B

S.E.

Wald

df

Sig

R

Exp(B)

Amount of
millage renewal
requested

.0686

.0165

17.3296

1

.0000

.2155

1.0710

Amount of
additional mills
requested

-.4922

.0983

25.0891

1

.0000

-.2644

.6113

Size of the school
district

-.3879

.2929

1.7539

I

.1854

.0000

.6785

Constant

1.5751

.4472

12.4074

1

.0004

Overall performance of the social psychological model
Percent of school millage elections
correctly predicted in June of 1990 =

79.23%

X = 60.072
df = 3
Sig. = .0000
2

millage passing decreases (sig. = <.00 ). These findings are congruent with the
1

research findings o f Piele (1983).
With regard to the impact o f a school millage renewal request on the
likelihood of the millage passing, we find that as the renewal numbers increase, the
likelihood that the school millage will pass increases by .069%. However, requests
for additional mills poses a threat to public school superintendents when estimating
the likelihood o f the school millage passing. For every one-unit increase in the
number of additional mills requested there is a .49 decrease in the likelihood that the
school millage will pass.
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The Pearson r coefficients show little or no intercorrelation among the size o f
the school district, the amount o f millage renewal requested, and the number o f
additional mills requested.
June Millage Elections 1991
Table 7 shows that the social psychological model increases in its ability to
predict school millage outcomes in June 1991. Approximately 81% of the school
millage elections for this time period are correctly predicted by the model. There is
clearly an association between the size of the school district, the amount of millage
renewal requested, the number o f additional mills requested, the success ratio of
previous school millage elections, and the likelihood of the school millage passing
(sig. = <

0 0 1

).

When examining the individual impact o f the independent variables on the
likelihood of the school millage passing, we find that: (a) as the amount of millage
renewal increases, the likelihood o f the school millage passing also increases
(sig. = .

0 0 0

); (b) as the number o f additional mills increases, the likelihood of the

school millage passing decreases (sig. = .0037); and (c) as the school millage success
ratio increases, the likelihood o f the school millage passing increases (sig. = .046).
For every one-unit increase in the amount o f mills renewed there is a .0915
increase in the likelihood that the school millage will pass. With regard to the number
of additional mills requested we find that for every one-unit increase in additional
mills requested there is a .3842 decrease in the likelihood that the school millage will
pass. The success ratio of previous school millages results in a .0065 increase in the
likelihood that the school millage will pass.
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Table 7
Likelihood o f Social Psychological Voting Characteristics Predicting
School Millage Outcomes in June o f 1991
Variable

B

S.E.

Wald

df

Sig

R

Exp (B)

Amount of
millage renewal
requested

.0915

.0176

27.0730

1

.0 0 0 0

.2866

1.0959

Amount of
additional mills
requested

-.3842

.1323

8.4294

I

.0037

-.1451

.6810

Size of the school
district

-.1965

.3651

.2898

1

.5903

.0 0 0 0

.8216

Success ratio of
previous school
millage requests

.0065

.0033

3.9637

I

.0465

.0802

Constant

.5921

.5674

1.0891

1

.2967

1.0065

Overall performance of the social psychological model
Percent of school millage elections
correctly predicted in June of 1991 =

80.94%

X2 = 60.181
df = 4
Sig. =
.0 0 0 0

The Pearson r coefficients show little or no correlation among the size o f the
school district, the amount o f millage renewal requested, the number of additional
mills requested, and the school district millage success ratio.
June Millage Elections 1992
During the month o f June in 1992, the social psychological model increased in
its predictive capacity from the previous two years by 7%. Table 8 shows that 87%
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o f the school millage elections were correctly predicted by the social psychological
model. There is an association between the size of the school district, the amount o f
millage renewal requested, the number o f additional mills requested, the school
district millage success ratio, and the likelihood of the school millage passing
(sig. = <

0 0 1

).

Three variables within the model have a statistically significant impact on the
likelihood o f the school millage passing. They are: (1) the size o f the school district
(sig. = .0241), (2) the number of additional mills requested (sig. = .0001), and (3) the
school district millage success ratio (sig. = .0168). The size o f the school district
decreases the likelihood o f the school millage passing by .8395 for every one-unit
increase in student enrollment. For every one-unit increase in the number of
additional mills requested, there is a .5214 decrease in the likelihood o f the school
millage passing. However, for every one-unit increase in the school millage success
ratio, there is a .0141 increase in the likelihood of the school millage passing.
The Pearson r correlation coefficients indicate little or negative correlation
between the size of the school district, the amount of millage renewal requested, the
number o f additional mills requested, and the school district success ratio.
Summary of Findings
Rational-Choice Voting and School Millage Outcomes
The rational-choice model of voting and school millage outcomes varies in its
ability to predict school millage outcomes during the years 1990, 1991, and 1992.
Overall, the model correctly predicts over 75% of the millage elections. However, the
association between median household income, households with children ages 5-17,
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Table 8
Likelihood o f Social Psychological Voting Characteristics Predicting
School Millage Outcomes in June o f 1992
Variable

B

S.E.

Wald

Amount of
millage renewal
requested

.0307

.0192

Amount of
additional mills
requested

-.5214

Size of the school
district
Success ratio of
previous school
millage requests
Constant

df

Sig

R

Exp (B)

2.5383

1

. 1 1 1 1

.0513

1.0311

.1346

15.0102

1

.0 0 0 1

-.2524

.5937

-.8395

.3721

5.0897

I

.0241

-.1230

.4319

.0141

.0059

5.7150

I

.0168

.1349

1.0142

2.4547

.7436

10.8974

1

.0 0 1 0

Overall performance of the social psychological model
Percent of school millage elections
correctly predicted in June of 1992 =

87.36%

X2
= 43.428
df = 4
Sig. = .0000

urbanization, ethnicity of the school district, school district unemployment, and
school millage outcomes varies among June millage elections for the years 1990,
1991, and 1992.
The impact o f the independent variables on the likelihood o f the school
millage passing parallels the findings of previous research on school millage elections
in some cases but not all. For example, the number o f persons living in farm areas
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shows a statistically significant impact on the likelihood of a school millage passing
for millage elections in June o f 1991 but not for the other two years in the study.
Social Psychological Voting and School Millage Outcomes
The social psychological model of voting and school millage outcomes
correctly predicts over 75% o f the school millage outcomes in school millage
elections during the month o f June in 1990, 1991, and 1992. The model consistently
shows that an association does exist between the amount o f the renewal requested,
the number o f additional mills requested, the size of the school district, the school
millage success ratio, and the outcome of the school millage election.
Increases in the amount o f the renewal increase the likelihood of the school
millage passing in June o f 1990 and 1991. As the size of the school district increases
in June of 1992, the likelihood of the school millage passing decreases. When the
number o f additional mills increases, the likelihood o f the school millage passing
decreases in June o f 1990, 1991, and 1992. My final discovery is that as the school
millage success ratio increases, so does the likelihood of the school millage passing in
June of 1990, 1991, and 1992.
Chapter V provides a summary and discussion of the key findings and their
implications for public school superintendents. In addition, future research
considerations are addressed.
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CHAPTER V
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
This study tested two voting behavior models of public school millage
election outcomes. Research on presidential and Congressional election outcomes
served as a theoretical base for this study. Two points are stressed throughout this
study. They are: (1) that voting behavior models developed for estimating
presidential and Congressional election outcomes are helpful in estimating the
likelihood that a public school millage referendum will pass, and ( ) that voters’
2

political attitudes and economic interests are integral to understanding public school
millage outcomes. A third point, that I will address later in this chapter, is that a
congruency must exist between public school millage campaign strategy suggestions
and voting behavior assumptions. If public school superintendents want to increase
the likelihood o f the millage passing, they must implement millage campaign
strategies that account for differences in voting behaviors.
There were several key findings in this study that may help Michigan public
school superintendents in understanding why their school millage referendum passes.
Summary of Key Findings
Two models o f voting behavior were tested to estimate the likelihood of a
public school millage referendum passing. They are: (1) a rational-choice voting
model, and (2) a social psychological voting model. The author analyzed the 561

79
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(K-12) public school districts in Michigan for a three-year period. They are: 1990,
1991, and 1992. The key findings were as follows:
1. Overall, rational-choice and social psychological models of voting behavior
facilitate the public school superintendent’s ability to estimate the likelihood o f
successful school millage election outcomes. Specifically, the rational-choice model
in this study was moderately strong in its ability to estimate the likelihood o f
successful school millage outcomes for the years 1990 and 1992. However, during
the month o f June 1991, the rational-choice model did not perform well statistically.
The entire model and its independent variables were statistically insignificant in
determining the likelihood o f a successful school millage outcome in June of 1991.
This may be attributed, in part, to the recession that led into the 1992 Michigan
elections. The recession effects may have been more prominent, during this time
period, at the local school district levels. The social psychological model, however,
was moderately strong in its ability to estimate the likelihood o f successful school
millage outcome for all three years.
2. As the number of persons living in rural farm areas increases, so does the
likelihood of the school millage passing. Of the 315 school millage elections held in
June o f 1990, 78% passed in very small school districts (< 2,500 students). These
public school districts were characterized by comparatively large rural-farm
populations.
3. As the number of civilians unemployed within the public school district
increases, so does the likelihood of the school millage passing. This finding, however,
runs contrary to Lankford’s (1985) finding. Perhaps this finding may be explained as
a preponderance o f local public school district voters in Michigan wanting to educate
themselves for employment opportunities when a high number of civilians are
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unemployed. This finding, however, should be viewed with caution because it proved
statistically insignificant for the years 1990 and 1991.
4. As the amount of the millage renewal increases, so does the likelihood of
the school millage passing. This finding is supported in the literature (e.g., Piele,
1983) and suggests that voters support their school millage more if there is no
additional economic burden placed on them. Furthermore, renewal requests tend to
be for maintaining current operations and not for expansion purposes. This finding
did not materialize, however, when analyzing June millage elections in 1992.
5. As the number o f additional mills increases, the likelihood o f the school
millage passing decreases. This suggests that voters reach a threshold in their support
for the local public school district. When the number o f additional mills increases, it
becomes harder for the voter to find an economic benefit that justifies a “yes” vote.
6

. As the size of the school district increases, support for the school millage

will decrease. This finding is congruent with the findings o f Lankford (1985) and
Henry (1987). However, it surfaced in only one of the three years analyzed (1992).
One explanation o f this may be that voters in larger school districts may feel
lower levels of community attachment and closeness. Voters, therefore, may feel that
the school millage has a personal economic cost greater than the overall economic
benefit to themselves or the community.
7. As the success ratio of previous millage requests increases, so does the
likelihood that the current school millage will pass. This finding is congruent with the
findings by Rubinfeld (1977) and Hall and Piele (1976). Past commitment by the
voters to their school millage request is the strongest estimator of the likelihood that
the school millage will pass.
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The key findings in this study raise an interesting question about voting
behavior assumptions and campaign strategies. Do millage campaign strategies
accommodate voting behavior assumptions? Public school superintendents need
campaign strategies that address voting behavior issues. The superintendent needs to
educate the school district voters about the millage and convince them of the benefits
o f supporting the referendum.
How well has the campaign strategy literature addressed this issue? I will
examine the utility of this literature for designing school millage campaigns.
Finding Congruency Between Voting Behavior Assumptions
and School Millage Strategies
Millage campaign strategies should reflect rational-choice and social
psychological voting assumptions. For example, if individuals vote their pocketbooks,
public school superintendents should focus upon the economic benefits obtained by
supporting the school millage request. On the other hand, if previous experiences by
the voters with their school district are negative, the superintendent must turn those
negative attitudes into positive feelings toward the school district.
Several authors and organizations (e.g., Banach & Cass, 1977; Clearinghouse
on Educational Management, 1977; Falkinham, 1976; Jones, 1977; Michigan State
Board of Education, 1984) have published millage campaign strategies for school
officials seeking to increase the likelihood of the millage passing. Their campaign
suggestions are derived from assumptions about voters and their decision-making
processes during an election.
How congruent are these millage campaign strategies with rational-choice and
social psychological assumptions o f voting? After content analyzing several campaign
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strategy publications (e.g., Banach & Cass, 1977; Clearinghouse on Educational
Management, 1977; Falkinham, 1976; Jones, 1977; Michigan State Board o f
Education, 1984), I found that a high level of congruency exists between the millage
campaign strategies published by Banach and Cass (1977), Clearing House on
Educational Management (1977), Falkinham (1976), Jones (1977), the Michigan
State Board o f Education (1984), and rational-choice and social psychological voting
assumptions. Table 9 shows 12 criteria that should be integrated into the millage
campaign if school officials want to increase the likelihood of passing the school
millage

.3

Over 60% o f the criteria selected focus on social psychological dimensions of
voting behavior. For example, several millage campaign strategies focus upon the
elimination of negative political feelings, such as alienation from the local school
system, while increasing positive political feelings through participation. Overall,
school millage campaign strategy suggestions tend to focus more on social
psychological dimensions o f voting rather than rational-choice.
The overemphasis on addressing social psychological dimensions o f voting
behavior should not lead public school superintendents to underemphasize the
importance of rational-choice considerations in their strategies. For example, smaller
school districts have concomitantly smaller electoral populations. Hence these voters
may feel more positive about the impact of their individual votes during the school
millage election. Conversely, those voters from larger school districts will tend to feel
less positive about the impact of their individual votes. The perceived impact of an
individual’s vote, according to rational-choice voting assumptions, decreases as the
electoral population increases. Therefore, voters from small school districts have a
distinct advantage in determining the impact of their vote over large school districts.
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Table 9
Millage Campaign Criteria as a Voting Behavior Dimension
Criteria

Rational-Choice

Social Psychological

Speaker bureaus

X

“Yes vote theme”

X

Business community support

X

Student, parent, teacher
cooperation

X

Direct personal contact

X

Openness of information

X

Reduction in money requested
from previous request

X

Use of brochures

X

Personal conferences with
businesses

X

Provide thorough explanation
o f why millage is needed

X

Newsletter
Cost per day emphasized

X
X

Sources: Banach, W. J., & Cass, F.. (1977). “You can pass that next financial issue—
with proper planning.” Journal o f Educational Communication, 2(3),
4-14.
Clearing House on Educational Management. (1977). Schoolfinancial
elections: Research action brief, Eugene, OR: University o f Oregon.
Falkenheim, K. (1976). “Organized work: The road to a successful
referendum,” Phi Delta Kappan, 57(9), 611-612.
Jones, W. J. (1977). Budget/finance campaigns: You can't afford to lose.
Arlington, VA: National School Public Relations Association.
Michigan State Board o f Education. (1984). Mapping your millage.
Lansing, MI: State Board o f Education.
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This is important to Michigan public school superintendents because the majority of
Michigan public school districts are small (<2,500 students).
Although an overwhelming number o f millage campaign strategies focus
primarily upon shaping positive political attitudes, three rational-choice voting criteria
permeate in every school millage campaign publication. They are: (1) reducing the
amount o f money requested from the previous millage that was defeated, ( )
2

providing a thorough explanation o f why the monies are needed, and (3) emphasizing
the cost-per-day to the voter if the millage is passed (Banach & Cass, 1977;
Clearinghouse on Educational Management, 1977; Falkinham, 1976; Henry, 1987;
Jones, 1977; Michigan State Board of Education, 1984).
Public school superintendents must be cautious in their attempts to increase
the millage request. We know from the findings in this study that increases in school
millage requests decrease the likelihood that the millage will pass. Therefore,
superintendents must carefully examine the past levels o f support for their school
millage requests and determine the closeness of the elections. For example, if the last
millage request passed by a slim margin, the superintendent must be careful not to
sway the voters away from supporting the current millage request by asking for too
much funding.
To facilitate the voters’ perception of little costs to obtain greater benefits,
the superintendent can increase the likelihood of passing the current millage by
showing voters how little the millage will cost them. For example, by demonstrating
that the school millage will cost the voters only a few pennies per day, the
superintendent will create a perception in the mind of the voters that this cost is
relatively inexpensive when compared to the overall economic benefit from
supporting the referendum. This, along with the superintendent staying within the
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financial bounds o f the voter, should increase the likelihood o f the school millage
passing.
Considerations for Future Research
Historically, scholars o f voting behavior have struggled with two issues. They
are: ( ) measuring political attitudes, and ( ) calculating the rationality o f casting a
1

2

vote for a particular candidate or public policy. These issues reflect a continuing need
by voting behavior scholars to increase the construct validity of social psychological
and rational-choice voting theory. This study proved no different. Applying voting
behavior models developed for presidential and Congressional election outcomes to
school millage outcomes is still an issue for voting behavior scholars. For example,
identifying the variables that reflect the economic interests o f school district voters is
challenging. We don’t know for sure whether or not minority voters see schooling as
a ticket to occupational success. Perhaps an examination of minority drop-out rates
and their linkage to perceived schooling benefits would answer this question more
accurately.
The National Center for Education Statistics has developed a comprehensive
data base consisting of several demographic and economic characteristics o f public
school districts in the United States. This centralized data base has facilitated
researchers in developing rational-choice voting models for millage election
outcomes. For example. The National Center for Education Statistics provides data
on the number o f households with children ages 5-17. This indicator serves as a
measure of an economic benefit derived from supporting a public school millage
referendum.
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We are lacking in a comprehensive data base on social psychological
indicators. Currently, there is no national data base similar to that o f the National
Election Studies data provided by the University o f Michigan. Political attitudes and
issue salience are currently measured on a case study basis. We need a national data
base of survey data that shows trends in public opinion by school district voters. This
data could then be analyzed to determine the impact o f political attitudes and the
salience o f an issue on school millage outcomes.
My final research consideration focuses upon the issue o f the social cleavages
that permeate urban and rural areas. In this study, the rational-choice model failed to
predict, consistently, school millage outcomes in Michigan public school districts.
School districts differ greatly in their ethnic and income distributions. Future research
should focus on testing differences in the impacts o f socioeconomic factors on school
millage outcomes. Do larger income variances or racial dispersions within a public
school district change the likelihood of a school millage passing? Superintendents
with heterogeneous school district characteristics may find it more difficult to pass
their school millages.
In order to win a millage election, public school superintendents must
understand their voters and the factors that shape their support for a millage request.
By understanding voting behavior models, the superintendent will increase the
likelihood o f passing the school millage request. This study has shown the value of
voting behavior models in predicting school millage outcomes. Knowing your
electorate is mandatory for passing a school millage.
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ENDNOTES
At this point, I will explain my use o f the concepts o f participation and
turnout. I refer to participation as the engagement of an individual in activities that
are political in nature. For example, volunteering for canvassing activities during the
election campaign or donating money to a particular political candidate are forms of
political participation. Participation does not mean, however, that a voter will turn
out on election day and cast a vote. Turnout could be construed as political
participation. However, I avoid this interchangability o f terms to accommodate the
rational model.
I refer to voter turnout as actually voting on election day. Some may argue
that turnout does not reflect the actual act of casting a ballot. It is difficult, however,
to conceive o f a voter going to the polls on election day and not casting a ballot. In
keeping with the tenets of rational voting theory, we must assume that turning out at
the polls and doing nothing would incur costs well above the benefits received by not
casting a ballot.
The author selected June millage elections for two reasons. First, the data
sets were incomplete for months other than June. In an effort to avoid partial data
gathering, the author used complete data sets on June elections. Second, more public
school districts in Michigan held milage elections in June than any other month.
Therefore, a greater distribution o f school district elections was provided.
There were 18 criteria extracted from the literature deemed crucial to
passing a school millage. Five o f the criteria were administrative in nature and not
related to the rational-choice or social psychological models. For example, strong
campaign organization and positive media coverage are administrative factors and
therefore are excluded from the table of successful millage criteria and voting
frameworks.
3
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CODEBOOK
Variable

Description

MEDHOI90

Median Household Income ’90

HOKIDS90

Households w/ children 5-17 years old ’90

PERURB90

Persons inside urban areas ’90

PERURO90

Persons outside urban areas ’90

PERFAR90

Persons—rural-farm ’90

PERNOF90

Persons— rural-nonfarm ’90

CAUCAS90

Persons non-Hispanic White ’90

AFRAM90

Persons non-Hispanic Black ’90

NATIVE90

Persons Native American ’90

ASIAN90

Persons Asian or Pacific Islander ’90

NOHISO90

Persons non-Hispanic other ’90

HISPAN90

Persons Hispanic ’90

CIVUNM90

Civilians 16 years of age or older unemployed ’90

NODIP90

Persons 20 years of age or older w/ 12th grade or less/
no diploma ’90

DEPLOM90

Persons 20 years of age or older w/ a high school diploma ’90

SOMECO90

Persons 20 years of age or older w/ some college but no
degree ’90

GRADU90

Persons 20 years of age or older w/ a bachelor degree or
higher ’90

STUDEN90

Number of students enrolled in the school district ’90

SIZE

Size o f school district ’90
1 = very small (300-2,499)
2 = small (2,500-9,999)
3 = medium (10,000-24,999)
4 = large (25,000-100,000 or more)
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PASS90

Millage passed ’90
= no
= yes
0

PASS91

Millage passed ’91
= no
= yes
0

PASS92

1

1

Millage passed ’92
= no
= yes
0

1

RENEW90

Amount o f millage renewal ’90

RENEW91

Amount o f millage renewal ’91

RENEW92

Amount o f millage renewal ’92

ADDIT90

Amount o f additional mills ’90

ADDIT91

Amount o f additional mills ’91

ADDIT92

Amount o f additional mills ’92

SURAT91

Millage success ratio ’91

SURAT92

Millage success ratio ’92

MINORI90

Total number of minorities within the school district that are
not o f Caucasian ethnicity, 1990
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